This seemed like an over-confident estimate of the enemy all the way through and some time later at the dinner table Wu Pei-fa looked at me thoughtfully for a few minutes and then said, apropos of nothing "You ought to know that you can-tot judge Chinese wars by foreign standards. You take into account the. number of men, the experi the officers, the qual equipment and their relative posi tions and figure out the probable result. Those factors don't mean #9 much here. If you have a little force with something to fight for that wants to fight and has confdence, and oppose to it a big force thatis not sure what it wants to do —the war is soon over and it isn't the little force that loses." Still later, after much other conversation had intervened, he closed this dis course by saying: "The Kuominchun are morally in a weak position and they know it. They might have the assurance to fight others, but they can't fight me."
This disjointed lecture on tha subject of the Chit psychology, contains a which every foreign military observer in China has come to re-agnize, at Grst in perplexity and afterwards with understanding Science, equipment, numbers and ion have not nearly so much to do with victory and defeat as confidence. Whether the moral issues enter into the matter or not is sub-Ject to doubt in most minds. They may with the leaders, but with the men it is certainly more a matter of confidence in the leader himself than in the merits of the cause, Wu Pei-fu appears to think that his men share his conviction in the honesty of his purposes while the enemy's troops are conscious of the weakness of their cause. Most of us who know the Chinese soldier would be much more inclined to think that it is Wu's personality that counts with his own follower and his reputation which takes the confidence out of the enemy.
This argument the writer did not take up, however, but asked what plans Marshal Wa had for the future beyond this campaign, to which he replied succinctly: "Kuangtung comes next."
"But what about Szechuan and Hunan?" T lusked, "Won't they need some attention before you can undertake a so far campaign and by the time we Szechuan will be settled.'
The Tariff Imbroglio The political situation in Peking he did not seem willing to discuss but entered with some spirit into the matter of the closing of the "Tariff Conference, when the writer asked him whether the report carried by a Japanese news agency to the effect that if the Powers did not resume the Conference when formal Government was formed, China ought to "declare" Tariff Autonomy. This he confirmed and then talked so rapidly in his own Gialect that the writer could not follow him. His feeling apparently fe that the Powers have nep given sufficient explanation of the step they have taken now in announcing: the suspension of the sessions after dealing amiably for so many months with a hostile Government, just when he and his allies are prepared to form a Government that would be friendly and conciliatory. His remarks upon the burlesque character of Chinese affairs the writer has already quot ed in another article.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.