The Archive · 1930

Naval Pact Before Commons

Strong Criticism by Mr. Winston Churel Conservatives Reservation of Freedom to Reconsider Situation London, May 15.

The Premier, Mr. Ramsay Mac-Donald, to-lay. opened a debate in the House of Commons on the London Naval Conference. He said he aimed at making a substantial contribution to the problem of, general disarmament. "We must] turn our attention," he said, "not merely to the sea, but to the air and land, because by mere limitation of one form of armament we are not going very far. A very serious circumstance has been the failure of the Naval Conference at Geneva in 1927, as a result of which' a great deterioration in the spirit for peace has taken place.

Although since the League of Nations had been created and arbitration and peace pacts had been signed, when they came to close grips with the problem of the provision of arms they found deplorably little value placed upon those peace pacts and those organizations to secure peace. Nations undoubtedly were falling back into their old mentality. Old fears and old superstations regarding security were returning and exactly the same kind of argument, so familiar before 1914, was coming up, unblushing and unashamed, to-day.

He did not say these things in order to strike a pessimistic note—quite the opposite—because the time was still with us when we could stop and, by making spirited efforts to change that mentality, we could still save Europe andthe World from what was called the next wi 'They had those things in mind, during the long days of the London' Naval Conference, There was a general view, said Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, that very little could be done by way of advancing naval disarmament until the United States and ourselves had come to an agreement. He thought that view was sound. The government's predecessors had said quite candidly they were perfectly willing the United States should build to parity. There was a certain school which expressed the view that it was unnecessary to pursue agreements any further as we never could imagine a conflict with America, and why should we worry about the force America was putting on the water, whether 8-inch cruisers or 6-inch cruisers? Whatever they cared to build was no concern of ours. That view wa: a very attractive one, but it was] very unsound.

If the whole world occupied with America the same relations which we had, it would be a sound view but, unfortunately, that was not the! cease. and whether we took notice of what was being done on the other side of the Atlantic or not, other nations would and it was with those other nations we were concerned. He had come to the conclusion after careful consideration the foundations of a really secure and international understanding relating to naval building must be an agreement between America and ourselves, such as able to effect at the Conference. That, piece of work had been done.

There were two other objects, continued the Premier, that the Naval Conference had to try and The first was this: what was so disconcerting to peace was not always the size of fleets but the growing competition in the building] of fleets. Competition in building, was worth a great sacrifice. They had succeeded, as regards three Powers at any rate, in stopping that competition and they had also succeeded in getting from two other Powers which, for various reasons, were unable to subscribe to that! part of the Treaty, a declaration that they were going to consider the situation in which they found themselves with a decisive determination to accommodate their building in future to the standard that had been put in Part IIT of the London Agreement. That was a very great achievement.

The second point was that relat-

tion was concerned, they had only, ing to reductions. So far as reduc-been able to get three Powers to agree to it, but the story was not yet finished. It was still being] continued and all he could say at present was that after - such a Speech as that delivered by Signor Grandi the other day he these _conversati cessful.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, coi inning. said there were various suggestions that we ought to use this opportunity either to devise new battleship or to reduce the tonnage of battleships. A battle-[ship at the present time was 35,000 tons and it was suggested we might put 10,000-ton battleships at sea instead of 35,000 tons. They would not get any two powers to agree to any sort of reduction of battleships. It they began to. tamper with battleships, they did not know where they were going 10 end. Instead of having a programme of a small type of battleship of 10,000 tons, the chances were that their naval designers would provide a new type of fighting vessel and. they would have to put a fleet or: section of a fleet of this smaller type on to the sea in order to keep, said Me. Ramsay Mac: Donald, "the view we took was sound one and that, instead tampering with battleships, we] [should stop building them "until 1936 and by 1936 there will have been plenty of time to consider] what is the function of battleships! in naval strategy: what is the size] lof a battleship, and what is the fuse of the heavier type of war! vessels or, what would please me far better, to see whether we can't {come to the conclusion that battleships had better be regarded as} obsolete altogether.

With regard to revisers, there! Iliad been a great deal of controversy' in which the Admiralty had been. blamed, but instead of 70, which had been the figure regarded up to now as the minimum of safety, they} had fixed upon 50, made-up of 15) jeight-inch and 35 six-inch cruisers. It had been said that was done by tus under pressure from the United States. That was not the case.

Before the United States gave any, views on the subject we were hav-jing this subject investigated by' our experts.

He would declare the Admiralty's position again so that there might!

no misunderstanding. The Admiralty's position was that, under conditions such to-day, the number of fifty cruisers would be accepted for a strictly limited period, provided always that other! Powers met our standard of fifty and provided also that in our fifty there was a proper proportion new construction suitable for; extended operations. The meaning] of that was nothing possible that} need shock his pacifist friends. A good many of our six-inch cruisers: were only meant to cover the North Sea and the waters immediately adjacent to our Coasts and in replacing them the Admiralty. said "We will require to have cruisers not of more tonnage nor} of heavier armament or anything] like that, but cruisers that will fenable our sailors to become comfortable inside them if they were further removed from Great Brit-Jain than these specially built w vessels could go." In conclu the Premier stated that the fon off programme in cruisers, destroyers and submarines _was estimated at a sum of about £15, Mr. Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the late Conservative Government, contend-Jed that the proposed Treaty was! not an Anglo-American treaty of party but a formal British accept ance of definitely power. He added that the Jservatives were unable to accept] lightest responsi nection with the Treaty and held themselves free to review the whole] situation.

The former Civil Lord of the Admiralty, the Rt. Hon. George Lambert, Po, on behalf of the Liberal Party, welcomed the Treaty as improving Anglo-American relations. He paid a tribute to that great nation, Japan; a nation, he said, which had always played the game with England; which fulfilled War, which did not take fits Treaty obligations during the!

umbrage when the Treaty between England and Japan was denounced.

'Mr. Lambert asked' whether the Government were going "on with the Singapore Base. He asked for 'a suspension of work on the Base in view of the signature of an Arbitration Treaty between Britain and Japan.

Mr. A. F. Brockway, Left Wing Labour member for East Leyton, urged the Government to make bolder disarmament proposals. He suggested, for example, that Gibraltar and the Suez Canal should be under—international Mr. Lloyd George, the Leader of the Liberal Party, said the understanding between' Britain, Japan Jand America reached in' London was worth more than a hundred cruisers. He declared that the results of the Naval Conference were satisfactory as far as the deep sea situation was concerned, but were unsatisfactory in regard to the narrow seas situation, which had become worse in many' ways because of the dormant prejudices. and rivalries stimulated.

Then ensued a sharp exchange of words between Mr. Lloyd George: ind Mr. Winston Churchill.

The former criticized Mr. Chur-for quoting in his speech "personal and secret" instructions: which Lord Curzon gave to Eutl Balfour for the Washington Conference.

Mr. Churchill" justified his action on the ground that nothing new was disclosed and that the document seas necessary and relevant to the Lloyd George retorted that the principle, if followed, would be disastrous, he asked for Mr. Baldwin's view, but the latter did not respond.

Later, however, the Conservative Leader suggested that, in view - of the lack of clearness in ther ding what document an ex-Minister might use, Mr. Lloyd George, himself and one or two other Cabinet experts should consider the matter and clarify doubtfal points.

Mr. MacDonald said he would sladly sist Mr. Baldwin in the but he did not agree that there was anything doubtful about to-day's incident. He was of the opinion: that" Mz. Churchill, before reading the document, should first have obtained the consent of the House, Mr. Churchill then admitted that he ought to have paraphrased the document, but contended that the extracts he had used were of a very] innocent nature and ¢puld not the least injury.

The First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. V. Alexander, who: ther, in view of their criticisms of the London draft treaty, the Conservatives intended to tell the coun-that, at the first opportunity, they would denounce the Treaty.

Conservative predecessor, Amery, replied that it obvious no Government. would ounce a treaty formally entered into, but when the Trenty was he hoped they would enter the discussions in a more watchful and more careful manner than the present Government, debate was then adjourned have given notices of a motion that the House is of the opinion that Part NI of the London Naval Treaty (which deals with light craft) is Jcontrary to the interests of the British Empire and ought not to be ratified.

Regarding the extract from the telegraphic instructions sent Lord Balfour when he was representing Great Britain at the Washington Naval Conference in 1921, which Mr. Winston Churchill Jquoted in the House of Commons the most important section fe cannot, in the face of the} freedom of France to construct a great submarine fleet—apart from the submarine and cruiser construction of other Powers—enter into. any agreement fettering our liberty to build whatever numbers and classes of cruisers and anti-submarine craft we think necessary to maintain our national and Tmperi In the course of his speech, Mr. Winston, Churchill described the!

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

Your account