The Archive · 1920

Enemy Submarines in a Future War

We notice in one of the Sunday papers an article by Mr. L. Cope} Cornford on future naval policy, says the "Naval and Military Re cord." The subject is one of high importance, and it is most desirable that the public should be furnished with an accurate resume of the data pertaining thereto, for public opinion will be the decisive factor when the time comes to choose whether we are to keep the British Navy supreme or let the trident pass into other hands. Mr. Cornford reaches the conclusion that in a future naval war the British Fleet will be powerless to save us from starvation, ever action our battleships may take, they cannot, he thinks, protect the mercantile marine from U-boat depredations, and, consequently, "for this country there is only one thing to be done, and that ig to reduce dependence' upon oversea food supplies to the lowest possible amount. Where we used to depend upon the British battleship we must now depend upon the British farmer."

Mr. Cornford recalls the vast expenditure of energy that was. needed to dispose of 200 hostile} U-boats. Ten thousand vessels, he declares, were employed in' the anti-submarine campaign, though we have always understood that 500 was the maximum number.

lis argument is that what the J-boats did once can be done again; that a new submarine guerre de course, waged on a larger and more intensive scale, woud probably starve us into submission.

Aw Expert at Fact, "During the war,' he states, "the British main fleet was the strongest in the world, yet was i¢ wholly unable to protect the mercantile marine." That is hardly the statement one would expect to read over the signature of a naval publicist. If Mr, Cornford means that the Grand Fleet did not directly protect merchant shipping, he is mistaken; if he means that the presence and operations of the fleet as a whole contributed little or nothing to the survival of our merchant. shipping during the war, he is grievously mistaken.

is beyond our comprehension how any serious student of the naval war could so misread the facts.

Nor is Mr. Cornford on firmer ground when he assumes that the revival of submarine "ruthlessness" in a future war would entail losses as heavy as, or heavier than, those we sustained in the late 'U-boat campaign. In the beginning we were caught unprepared. The possibility of a deliberate submarine war on merchant shipping had not been seriously considered, and measures] of defence had therefore to be improvised at short notice. Those measures, crude at the outset, were gradually developed to such a

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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