The Archive · 1923

THE POWERS' GREAT OPPORTUNITY—I

July 13.

THERE are times when it is specially important to stand back as it were and take a, comprehensive view of the course of events. Disunion and anarchy have become so commonplace in China, and the manceuvrings of her politicians are so intricate and so much confused by the difficulty of remembering names and parties, that we are prone to turn from them in disgust and weariness, as from a thing past praying for. Now and then some spectacular occurrence, like the dramatic career of White Wolf or the outrage at Lincheng, rouses the foreign community to make frantic protestations to their respective Home Governments. But the scandals of purely Chinese politics do not touch us directly, especially in our sheltered and well regulated life in Shanghai, and inasmuch as they are, as said above, extremely difficult to follow. through the daily kaleide scope of their ceaseless convoltions, we tend at last to ''take them as read.'' And this surely is to be regretted. For the force of the foreign community's representations to their Home Governments, and the chance of their being Vstened to, depend on our ability not only to put them convincingly in the first place, but to expose and defeat all the customary excuses for doing nothing that come back in answer to our pleadings. We are all justifiably disgusted that the urgent protestations of all the big interests and organizations touching Lincheng have led and, it begins to be feared, will lead, to nothing. Of this two things may be said: that perhaps too many different counsels have been sent Home; and that, the Powers having failed to act promptly, now find it increasingly difficult to act at all. At this unfortunate juncture, the events of the past month in Peking would seem to have fallen straight from the lap of the gods. For they present the Powers with a golden: opportunity, a policy clearly realizable and constructive, for the benefit of the Chinese people and every foreign interest.

Let us then briefly recall the history of those events. On June 6 a telegram from Peking announced that the Cabinet had resigned en bloc, having come to loggerheads with the President over some appointments which he refused to countersign, and that the Premier, General Chang Shou-tseng, had left for Tientsin. By first apbearances there was nothing to differentiate this from any other of the numerous unremembered crises of the past. The Cabinet could get no money, so it went out, as many had done before. But very soon a deeper, more sinister explanation was revealed. On June 9 all the police and gendarmerie went on strike for want of their pay. The outlook appeared so serious that the Legation guards were turned out to patrol the streets near the Quarter. Yet it was only a political manceuvre. The men had not struck, they were told to go out by members of the party which was working to' make General Tsao Kun president, in order to intimidate President Li Yuan-hung. There followed ''popular demonstrations,'' at a handful of cents a demonstrator, outside the palace, while General Feng Yuhsiang, whose troops were an important factor, announced to the country that he would allow no new Cabinet to be pointed while President Li remained in Peking. On June 12 President Li gave in and departed for Tientsin. He tried to baffle his enemies by hiding his seal of office, but was caught at Tientsin station and forced to disgorge. He took with him, however, a number of blank forms ready sealed and for some days continued to issue mandates to which nobody paid any heed. He seems to - have passed out of political history.

But the flight of President Li did not, as had been hoped, open the way for President Tsao. The outrageous devices by which the

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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