ies' Campaign Against Kuominchun: Wu Pei-fu Let Down by. Men Who'
Never Really Meant to. Fight Prom Roowey Guaxer port from any of their heavy-weight but sluggish allies, is a clear jindieation to all foreign observers that there is something fundamentally wrong with the Kuominchun organization—either bad generalship Jor Joss of morale. The obvious [thing for the Kuominchun leaders ito have done, as soon as they Jwithdrew from Peking, was to have launched a crushing blow at Shan-so as to have kept their own ines of food communication with the west secure and to have threatened Wa Pei-fu in western Chibli, Honan and Shensi, Instead of this they were content to hold Yen! Hsi-shan, to live on short rations for many weeks while the local [wheat crop was ripening, and allow Wu Pei-fu to bring his riff yaff auxiliaries into line and push few columns up through the hills in western Chihli where they could give Yen Hsi-shan material sup port.
Betrayed by Chin Yun-a0
Wu Pei-fu did not underrate the Kuominchun in this situation. He Jeounted on Chin Yun-ao and was betrayed. Either Juck or some essential flaw in the Kuominchun organization favoured him, because after all his weeks of delay he was Jable to move three columns through the. hills from points between Paotingfu and Peking and keep the Kuominchun sufficiently engaged to, relieve Yen Hsi-shan. Before considering what Wu's scheme of eampaign was it might be well to review his resources.
When he retreated from Shanhai-Ikuan in 3924 he caryled with him Jon his gunboats and steamers a couple of regiments of the elect and these entered into exile with him at Yochow. When he came Jdown to Hankow at the opening of ithe year 1926, he was already re-Jeruiting; and when he started his campaign into Honan, early in February, the new 3rd Division had already had about seven months training. In addition to these. he had control, even before Hsiao Yao-nan's death, of the Sth National Division (Liu Chien-chane) and the Ast and 2nd Hupeh Divisions under Kou Ying-chieh. Chin Yun-abetted an attack upon Honan from the south by going around through Kiangsu and Shantang and collecting on the Shantung-Honan order the rabble under Hu Ching-i's former lieutenants Tien Wel feW'in and Wang Wei-wei. Chin and these renegades never" had any fighting to do because Yueh Weijchun's bandit armies never stood fire, and the most blood shed was that spilled by the Red Spear folk when they caught. retreating {ties of the 2nd Kuominchun and finished them off with dull wrought. iron implements of various sorts.
Chin Promptly Dismissed In anticipation of Wu's. victory in Honan Chin Yun-ne, who had walked easily into Kaifeng and Chengchow, with Tien Wei-chin Jand Wang Wei-wei as his supporters was confident that he would be Tapan of Honan while his dis Jeredited elder brother, Chin Yun-Peng, ex-Premier of China, was rushing to and fro, preparing for hhis own reassumption of office. One of Wu Pei-fu's eccentricities, however, is that he shows no sympathy whatever for the overweening Jaspirations of exalted coolie dom. When he had Honan in his hand the made it clear to the Chin brothers that their reward was not yet. Kou Ying-chieh was put in charge of Honan and Chin Yon-
Jao was sent on into Chihli with his Shensi and Honan troops, supported by Mi Chen-piao's I-chun, Jand told to keep on fighting. Here the fighting threatened to be serious, Chin Yun-ao, thinking Wu Pei-a long way eff and unlikely to come nearer, entered into the pleas ant relations with Lu Chang-lin and the Kuominchun which immediately preceded. the latter's evacuation lof Peking. These flirtations nearly least Wa Pei-fu the confidence of Ichang Tso-lin, moreover. When Pei-fu arrived at Paoting, about [Jone 1, and announced to, Chin. Yun-
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.