The Archive · 1920

CHINA'S NATIONAL GROWTH

Sept. 15.

Painlevé's career did cly prove him so, his impressions of China, given to Reuter and published by us yesterday, would be enough to show that-he is a remarkable man. We do not remember any vase! tions, the fruit of so short a visit, more lucid and so- penetrating and that M. Painlevé can have found time to see so much amid all the formidable entertaining that he had to undergo is really amazing. For us who watch and try to follow the manceuvrings of the different parties on China's political stage, ever grouping and regrouping.themselves anew, it is often most difficult not to grow disheartened over her future.

It is the old story of not being able to see the wood for the trees. What we ought always to strive to bear in mind is that the ills from which China suffers are those incidental to growth, not to stagnation, still less to decay. The military disorders and the rivalries of Tuchuns, rightly described by M. Painlevé as superficial, are mainly the struggles of the old order of mandarins to cling to power and privilege, which they know are slipping from them in the evolution of ideas, customs and industries.'" That is why the old Vorder in Peking, and not only there. allies itself, even at the cost of submission, to the old order in japan. There is really far more community of interest between the people of China and the people of Japan (as contrasted with their officials) than either at present understands. Meanwhile, public opinion already exists in China... it is already singularly powerful and will soon be irresistible."" One might say that the paradox of China to-day is that the more she tends to split up politically, the more united she becomes nationally.

There can be no question that the birth and development of this national public opinion, which now runs, even though—feebly, through all provinces, is by far the most important feature of recent Chinese history. Public opinion cannot exist very long without becoming political opinion, in which hitherto China has, like all Oriental countries, been conspicuously wanting. And this we have already seen demonstrated in the driving from office of the three traitors and in the fact that Chang Tso-lin did not dare to suppress General Wu Pei-fu by force, but was obliged to smother the obnoxious views he held by craft. In both instances the weakness of public opinion was as much revealed as its strength. Without its support General Wu Pei-fu would never have been able to' go se far as he did: yet at the crucial moment it left him without that visible endorsement which was needed to enable him to lead his army into the capital. And while public opinion was able to force certain Ministers out of office last year, it could not destroy their secret hold nor the principles which had made them hateful. But too much must not be expected of a force so young as this new Chinese public opinion. That it exists is the great thing: that it will grow stronger cannot be doubted. "How it will finally assert itself, no one can foresee. Civil war on any large scale appears improbable, for one of the manifestations of the people's feeling is a growing disinclination to kill each other at their rulers' bidding. But just as the scab on a healing wound grows daily though imperceptibly smaller, so we believe the excrescence of Tuchunate and military mandarindom will gradually be sloughed off the face of China by the force of healing agencies within, What, then, will remain and on what lines is China destined to evolve? Bad as has been the rule of the Tuchuns, in one respect it has accorded with Chinese predilection, namely, in its steady trend towards local autonomy and independence, the offspring of the instinct for family and clan which is still the strongest influence in Chinese minds. If and when, therefore, the Tuchuns go. it seems probable that the framework of government which they have made will remain. In a well informed article of which we publish the first part to-day, a contributor analyses the various groupings into which China is momentarily divided. These will, of course, change to-morrow or next day. But the lesson to be learnt is that Peking is now not even a primus inter pares. It is demonstrably weaker and inferior to its chief provincial rivals, and it is difficult to believe that China as a whole will ever again submit to Peking's domination in internal matters, though it may accept it as the mouthpiece of

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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