'There can'be no possible doubt that among the masses of the People, among all classes but the official' classes, the yearning for a restoration is almost as intense the general yearning for peace and order. The Republic has boon a nightmare to them. So far as the people are concerned, republicanism has been weighed in the balance and found wanting. Ail adult Chinese have expert enced two forms of administra. tion—imperial and republican—and while neither is in their memories immaculate, the latter has been so infinitely' worse than the former that they can conceive of no happier event than reversion to the old régim This reactionary spirit is not confined to the merchants and farmers alone. Tt is beginning to pervade all officialdom as well, The official classes are beginuii tobe nervous about Chin ultimate fate. They will sacrifice nothing to improve conditions for the benefit of a rival, ut the complete collapse of China would bring them down with their country und they would all find themselves mired in the same bog with the chance that the toughest und hardiest would climb out over them. Rather than lose all they would be ready to concede something. A. serious threat of foreign aggression might bring about a monarchy movement' in the same way that it might bring about an armed truce among the militarists and a peace conference. A determined popular movement, or a determined expression of the public will might precipitate it, But it is not likely that any of the big military commanders, with the possible exception of Chang Tso-lin, will in the near future attempt either to restore the Manchus or to set up a new line on his own initintive, because they all have too keen an appreciation of the diffi culties in the way h the writer has outlined. nor wy wHoa?
The restoration of a monarchy, like the establishment of a dictatorship, seems remote at this moment because, barring the stimulus of foreign aggression or 1 great popular rising (both very fant prospects), the re-coal. ishment of an Empire depends upon the re-conquest of the greater part of China. There is no man commanding troops now who has the military capacity for conquering the greater part of China, nor the closely knit organization with which he could do 'u Pei-fu is undoubtedly China's ablest fighter but he has scattered and weakened his organization and has dissipated hi resources by sending out exped tions of riff-raff under the ce mand of notorious failures. His ablest_generais have left his 1m-mediate command to be Talis, Tuchuns, Civil Governors and Super-Tuchuns and he has lost his reputation as a disciplinarian by allowing hordes of bandits to cut their wildest capers, on his very doorstep.
The reconquest of China by small compact force of well di ciplined and well trained men is not impossible: but it is not possible to any of the leaders or any of the organizations now operating in China. Under these condi: tions it is not worth while di cussing the relative merits of a Manchu restoration and the erect tion of a new dynasty. One need neither hope nor fear that. cither imminent or even possible in the immediate future. As means of restoring peace and order they are remote means, if they are really means at all.- And what we are vitally' interested in is rot a far away cure of China's ills gad if you gentlemen, will, drag; just: there, you will fin But some immediate solution, if there is one. planation i obvious! Some poor angry interrupting! "The ex-"Dolt," said the Eineceangs fellow haa-been fishing from this
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.