Mr. Kuei next says that if Chinese speculators have bought railway bonds in anticipation of intervention, they are bound to lose, because intervention would inevitably depress the market as a change of Cabinet Jaffects the frane in France oF. a3 the occupation of the Ruhr affected the mark. The writer knows nothing of French or German finance but he has been watching the Chinese market and its reactions for a 1 time, and, in his sight, Mr. Kwei's illustrations are about as unhappy as they could possibly be.
The fall of a lecture, in text book style, to prove the elemental truth that "any bond, no matter how well secured it may be, cannot be absolutely free from a speculative nature, because its is dependent on factors over wi it has no control." This sounds weighty, but he might as well have told me that. "circumstances alter} "if he is striving to educate me in economics. He then points out that the poorer the security the more active a bond is on the market and ives the obvious reasons. He then ites one of his unfortunate illustre tions. He contrasts the inacti market for the "well secured" domestic bonds ang the active and] erratic'market for the so-called 96- to pay in any form are wholly depenident upon the Government's promise to pay, and not upon the paternal control' of certain French revenues by Powers that keep fleets in French Waters, political instability naturally] Jdepresses all French securities, paper money included. The Allied oc-Jeupation of the Ruhr, T must also remind Mr. Kwei, was an invasion! of a country perfectly capable of governing itself, as China is not, which worked to reduce peace, good order, and productivity while imposing an enormous burden of debt.
China is not Germany and_the Chinese are not Germans; so China
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.