Geesax, Stusrecy aw rue Greer Wan." "By Liewt.-Colonel Philie Neate, Vib W805, Edwin Arnold &° Go." 30s! ba. het, Count von Sehlieffen beeanie Chief of the German Great Gen: eral Star in 1891. Te was a providential circumstance for the Allies thit he was not Chiel of the Great General, Staif in 1914. If he had been the chances are that Germany instead paying reparations would to-day be jroq'iving them, or Kt the genius of Seblieffen, descriyed not too extravagantly by Ludendorft as "one of two rear soldiers who. ever" lived," which conceived the great Gi man plan partinliy: put into force the very beginning of the There cannot be the slightest doubt that it Tailed beowuse Schlieffen's successor, the younger Moltke, threw over an tegal and vital part of Schlietfen's masterly conarption, Sch Yieffen was an extraordinary ing. Ho was merely a human embodiment of military yrolems. Colonel Neame velates on acted a habit of setting his subordinate staff offieers holiday tasks on all festive occasions such as Christmas, for hho said that then they could devot their brains to the larger military' problems undisturbed by routine work.
night of nothing but the farmy. atid ite take in Hin war-plan occupied all his. thoughts even on his death-Sat Almost the dea words which he murmured to his, son-infan, General Vou Hahnke "Lo must come to & fight.
piake the right" wing strong." Alas for the shade of Schliefion, "Moltke, inthe depths folly and weakness, made the right wing weak Moltke's plan maintained the: neutrality of Holland, which Schlieffen, had apparently intend-violate. But the principal difference Yetween the two" conceptions lay in Moltke's omit ting from the right wing the "orbit" formations intended ta follow in rear of the armies., and only (0 roach the front at Paria Moltke could probably have oar-ried out these munwuvess,
quiring any greater fro Neume thinks, without deploy. on, and could
the right wing have maint across the Maastri Presumably he intended to avoid -Jall risk of invasion of Alnco-Lorraine: but in doing 80, the wfolated" two. leading principles of war: (1) Condaudation at the decisive point, in that he had not the strength ow his offense wing to envelope the ies without allow gaps to arise his own detachments south of Metz fulled to hold the Lih forees there, Tt may bs considered, says Cole anal Neame—and judg; vents no other 60 examples of sound strategy can he found thin the campaign of Ta Mastrian Lakes aad. the scoond vibierg and they
invasion of Poland in, 1014. Ludendorft had not been thrown out of t War Office by. the poli 101%. he would favo been Moltke's Director of Military Operations at Supreme Command in August, 1914, He was an ardent disciple off tha grant "Soblieffen and. hie war plans, and his strength of char Acter is admitted.
Would he have kept Moltke on the right path. and what then would have teen the youl of the Marie eampaicot The author eid and extremely of German war strategy clearly the answer
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