fact that General Chiang-Kai-shek has placed himself at the Read of the organization for the suppression of the bandit {rouble has to a large extent evoked confidence in the ult! mate success of the plans whi may be devised to that end. General has, during the last few months, acquired an el hanced reputation for pressing through to fulfilment his dedo: ed policies. There is ground for the contention that he has proved himself an organiser as well as an adept at taking full advantage of favourable opportunities. The mere fact that in May next it is. proposed to hold the often contemplated People's Conference will be a potent stimulus to him in exerring all his energies for the removal of the power which is endangering his own and, moreover, hampering the retura of the country generally to the peaceful and profitable employment so necessary for economic rehabilitation. If the Nanking Government, relieved of their pre-occupations with civil warfare, and assured of friendly sympathy in the North, thanks to the relations now subsisting Marshal Chang Hsueh-Ving, can forcefully impose their will on the roving bands which are terrorizing the pro-demanding] vinces in the interior and mak-|@¥y bandits to disturb their years of study, the sooner ing the journey of commerce up|eW-found quietude. So, where-the cackle is cut the more and down the Yangtse constant- 48, not so very long ago the ly marked by peril to life and property, they will have immeasurably advanced in the opinion of the people of Chin: They will be able to turn to ti peaceful consolidation of their administration with an assurance which will bear fruit in dissipating many of their most depressing difficulties.
The suppression of bandits necessarily involves a problem of peculiar urgency. It prevents the Government from giving te the disbandment of thei troops that undivided attention for which their financial advisers would otherwise look. To some it may sound simple to take troops recently engaged in ws fare of a more or less regu! kind and despatch them agai bandits whose ideas of disc line, whose knowledge strategy and whose organization likely to be primitive in the extreme. Unfortunately there are certain psychological factors which militate against the a ceptance of this view. To begin with troops who have beea told that, efter severe hardships in the field, they have been vietorious, are apt to look eagerly for reward in the shape of an easier life and, perhaps, a share in the luxuries of civilian existence. So far from being less rigorous, a campaign against guerilla bands, in difficult counization for. miliiary operations on a grand scale, demands the highest qualities of pertinacity and bravery. It is not necessarily beyond the power of the Government to evoke those qualities from the men who have served them against the North but there can be no doubt that General Chiang Kai-shek will have to employ all the prestige of his own nam> to counteract the disappointments which this additional burden on some of his men wi':
i]. That he has been abi i in cert directions and to devise definite plans is all to the good. But those who expect a lightsiax change in the situation will disappointed; they may Well asked to be patient and to give the Government a fair char a task which would be d ficult in any country, let alon~ one worn-out by civil war, dis-fraught by incessant inflictions and gravely impoverished. at a time of acute economic depression.
Reports have been received showing that the bandits in the Middle Yangtse valley affect io despise the threat of the on-ight of the Government troops. They: are credited with the boast that they will plenish their coffers and the armour ies at the expense of their intending opponents, who they do not indeed convert the: opponents to their cause. Tha this bravado is completely just! fied definite information from one provinee—not in the Middl Yangtse it is true—bluntly refutes. From Chekiang it is 1 ported that the people are in good heart over the prospect of better crops and, also, because they have received back in their midst several thousand men recently engaged on the Lunghai Front against the army of Marshal Feng Vu-hsiang. These men, incidentally, declare that they lost heavily against the Kuominchun forees—to the extent it is alleged of 80 per cent. of their strength. They believe that, had not General Yen Hsi-shan been so completely defeat: ed in Shantung, they themselves would have been over-run by the enemy. Their arduous campaiya has hardened them; it has made them anxious however, to.geturn to peaceful pursuits and' to be spared further warfare, Yet they are not disposed to allow bandits were treating the locat police of Chekiang with supreme contempt—disarming them while they looted the inhabitants at I—they now realize that other and sterner material iv available to the people of Choy kiang who are left in peace for the development of their' better agricultural prospects. Another factor in the situation is said to be the contentment of the returned soldiers with the manner of their treatment by the Government. Complaints of bait food, poor equipment and arrears of pay are not so prevalent among them, The result is that they and the people whom they have returned are readier to unite in endeavouring: to maintain peace against the bandits. This picture may be too roseate in hue; it may darken when the first rapture of the returned soldiers dies away i Chekiang. If however, it bears resemblance to conditions in other provinees, either in being or in prospect, then there should be great hope for a more rapid extermination of the bar-dit hordes than seemed at one time possible to entertain.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.