Great Britain's broth suffers from the proverbial multiplication [cooks, as everyone of her diplomatic agents will admit. The British Government, apart from such difficulties as a Russian-tutored labour group in Parliament presented before the General Strike, has been ized by short-sighted oppor-advisers. The banks want} this, and make it every clearly known, the big merchants want that, and have their agents on the job to say 0; the missionaries circulate pamphlets wanting one thing on Jone side of the street and another on the other. Hongkong has its vojciferous wants voiced—through numerous stentorian mediums whose vocal accomplishments make up for their short-sightedness. The Governor of Hongkong distinguishes himself by his far-sightedness and sanity, but fails to make the requisite noise, only carrying enough ght in London to make the high shapers of policy feel that it would well for a little while longer to nothing. Peking blows this way' end that, according as it takes least effort to' face the wind or bend be-|j fore it. The merchant with a deal] on says in London: "Do nothing or you will ruin my deal and have me pauper on your hands." Another merchant, j shouting for! "Save me or I
My deal fell through and! without forceful support I'm lost!"
Palled Both Ends Together nda in Great Britain'
Labour to fight the proper protection of "British trade in China just when the ex-excise of a little determination would have guaranteed the security of that trade and helped at Home in the handling of the unemployment prolem. The British trades unions were made the most efficient for their own undoing. The British Government naturally saw the do-Imestic problem created by the Reds in much larger perspective than the foreign one, so handled the one leficiently and the other inefficiently while Russia was expending her best efforts upon both. It was therefore a foregone conclusion that she should win in China, For the first time in many generations the British Foreign Office has lad no consistent policy in China, thanks to a multiplicity of advisers and some confusion in thought balancing domestic and Far Easter interests. The advice of no functionary in the East was accepted. Recommendations from the Minister fin Peking, the Hongkong Governor, various Admirals, various special delegates on several commissions, plus the London representatives of 'a couple of banks and a couple of jig hongs, were all thrown hat and drawn as they happened to Jeome. While England was showing such manifest inability to arrive at a policy, it ill behaved an American or a Japanese agent in Peking to suggest to his Government a step in advance. Great Britain's Admiral, or Minister, or Governor, oF banker, might say: "Hang it all, 'T'm with you and I'l stand by you, if the Foreign Office show some signs Jof determination on this point." But the someone would rise i ment, in answer to a Jquestion and on behalf of the Government, and assure the world that Great Britain was passionately toager to hand China whatever she asked, though it might be her lif blood, and orders would come out to reverse the whole policy of the preceding day. Taking this hint, [someone then rises up in Washing: ton and says: "We believe sincerely in government of, for and by the people in China and we have desire to meddle with the development of such government," something equally brilliant. it has been utterly futile for influential Americans or Japanese to suggest a China policy to their governments that would display an. intelligent understanding of real conditions in this country while these govern. ments could always say: "Britain has evolved no such policy, How can_we take the initiative?"
For these various reasons our reactions to China's consistent, cam paign for our complete undoing have een futile gestures of protest for the most part, with an occasional spasmodic action which, in its ix0- Tation, has only served to supply the anti-foreign agitators with a text, On Encouragement to Suicide If the Powers had deliberately set out to lead China on, to encourage her in her own ruin and to prompt radical leaders to excesses, advertise their purpose throughout the world and incriminate their country, they could not have done it more adroitly. They have confirmed her in the belief that diplomatic action is only taken to put a document on file in the Waichinopu and will never under any circumstances be backed by a show of force, yo that row, if they did really agree to insist on anything, the Chinese would be prepared tobe most. indignant about it. We have allowed the Chinese to treat diplomatic documents with contempt for so long that there is now no diplomatic measure to which the Powers can resort that will have any effect whatever upon the Koo's and Chen's unless it is supported by a display of force, and yet there is no forceful action in defence of our persons, property or rights which we can take, oven in the face of the most outrageous and impudent treatment, that would not be regarded by the Chinese, the Red agitators, certain missionaries, sentimentalists and labour leaders abroad, as an act of "aggression."
The Foreigner Always Wrong If I were to resist looting soldiers my own house and succeeded in beating them off, the Chinese would feel resentful about it and the Reds would somehow construe it highhanded abuse of my preroga {tives as a foreign resident in Chins Leagues of mythical public bodies would publish open letters to. the Waichiaopu demanding that I be deported, that the American ter apologize, that all forei Possessing weapons be disarmed and the like. The commander of the troops would certainly say that T had perpetrated an assault upon body of his men sone fo, my pre, the Ws nounce that these were the facts, It is into this state of mind thal jour futile diplomacy has led the Chinese and in this temper they ace eanitutions like the Natiogal being confirmed by miami
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.