The best and the easiest way out, think the Japanese, would be ciliation; and hope for conciliation between Mukden and Canton, in-stoad of a clash on the Yangtze between the North and the South, predominates here to-day.
One writer of prominence defi-nitoly declares that the Northernors under Chang Tso-lin will not dusk with the Southern revolationimately be unavoidable," he "but seems to havesbeen avoided for the time being at least. Chang repped the contemplated cam ageinet the South down the Ticntsin-Pukow line to Shanghai and Nanking. Tt was an extra-moly risky campaign for the—Mukden [warlord and he was wise to drop St. His position north of the Yang tze\ was none to secure. and the: same may be said of Chiang Kai-' shek's: position south of the Vangtze. Neither the North nor the South is to-day prepared to cross the Yangtze and direct an offensive Accordingly, there will be a temporary armistice, until, after jundehand manceuvres and propaganda campaigns, the balance of power is disturbed."
The possibility of Chang being is also Press. Publicists here think there is quite Jo fore-seeable chance of such a development, and say that, if Chang fs isolated, Japan would have to bear "almost exclusively the brunt of fresh anti-foreign agitation." Tt is even thought that what happened in Hongkong may be repeated in these are, perhaps, remote contingencies, but the Japanese press look upon them as quite possble none the less. Hence the uncertainty that exists in Japan in handling the Chinese situation—beyond protecting her nationals and their property. Intervention frowned upon to-day, but. as one Journal remarks, it may well happen that Japan would wish for intervention when it is too late, "By, ime," concludes this writer, Great Britain would have adjusted her affairs with the South and apan may have to act alone—if she
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.