The Archive · 1932

THE SITUATION Jon, 26

The situation develops slowly' but the weight of the movement] seems to be on the Japanese ther than on the Chinese side. Yesterday it is understood that certain conferences were held.

nese Ministers have been at variance. Mr. Sun Fo and Mr.

Eugene Chen are reported to have resigned. The desire to comply with Japanese demands has been expressed but, so far as could be ascertained at a late hour in the afternoon, no decision had been reached. This does not strike the observer as likely to be impres-Jsive to the Japanese authorities. They have no doubts in their} minds. Movement, to them, does not imply hesitation. It follows direction and intention with slavish accuracy. Even now] that aspect of the crisis does not appear to have forced itself on the notice of the Chinese, although} it would be unfair to suggest] that they are the only victims of that form of stagnation at the moment. As things are the probability of Japanese action in seizure of certain points in Chinese territory—action which is bound to precipitate a clash with Jconsequences as yet incalculable—is dominant.

The Chinese view that, action by the Powers is indicated is not warranted by the facts.—The situation as it stands turns on the presentation by the Japanese authorities of certain clear-cut demands arising out of incidents for which Chinese administration is technically and actually responsible. Swift attention to that} ff such it may be regarded—is surely imperative. The Powers can hardly' be asked to or expected to join! fgsue when the matter is so simple and so limited in its scope. Whether the consequences of action on one side or inaction on the other will create an entirely new position and widen the implications of the problem is entirely a hypothetical question, No doubt the course of events in li shanghai during the last few days has been closely watched in Europe and America. It would be rash to pretend that more is likely to emerge from the process in the present stage.

The Chinese authorities are stated to be convinced of the need for coming to terms with Japan at the earliest possible moment. Their trouble seems to lie in their inability to recognise that time is the essence of the contract. It is practically. immaterial whether the realities with which they are confronted Jcome from the unjust dispensaition of a malign fate, from the perverse malice of human agency: Jor from the defects of their Jown composition. They are responsible for the display lof prudent solicitude for the welfare of their country. They. can preserve its prestige most effectively by totally disregard ing their own prestige. 2 may be objected that their task is too difficult. If it be then there cane little doubt that it will be attempted on thei behalf by others. It is impossi ble to avoid sympathy with them in their plight, however plainly it may be derived from their own past errors of omission and commission. Promulgation of new principles designed to retrieve those errors must be deferred, The need now is for definite tion in one direction only—a prompt and unmistakably effective acceptance of the inevitable} Jclaims now made upon them with! compelling insistence.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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