The Archive · 1928

Record Transactions

Last year, for example, 576,990, 875 shares, worth come $50,000,000, 000—say' £10,000,000,000—were bought on the New York Stock Ex-[change alone. That was a record—over 125,000,000 shares more than in 1926; back in 1913 it was something like 83,000,000, and the value was little more than one-seventh that of last year.

To say that this was all in the nature of a gamble would, however, be, drawing too long a bow. There must have been some legitimate Sunday School bun-fight, with ordinary cakes and tea.

One of two fireworks, I was told, might be exploded at night, but they would be homely English ones in any case, as the pugnacious native variety could no longer be obtained from China.

But I did encounter a man who had been to a private party over a Chinese cafe in the Causeway the previous night, to see the Old Year out and the New Year in His name was not Ching, Chung, or Chang, but plain Charlie Brown, junt., landlord of the Blue Posts hostelry: in the West India Dock-road.

"No, nothing much happens now: days," he said, "but before the war, Pennyfields on New Year's night] would be littered with spent fire works inches deep. The police stopped all that "There is usually a procession to the Chinese corner of the local cemetery, where the relatives leave! food on the graves, and perhaps a Dit of a bust-up if the evening," he! added, but it is only in the Chinese quarters of New York and San Francisco that they have processions with dragons.

London's Chinatown, since Mr. Burke abandoned it, has become rather like Poplar, which is a pity "Westminster Gazette. business. But it is certain that a very small margin of these purchases wore for investment, where the buyer paid for the stocks and put them away to hold indefinitely. Probably more than 90 per cent. were merely speculative, the buyer of course depositing a margin of say ten dollars a share to protect the broker, intending to sell as soon as the stock advanced to a point that would yield a satisfactory gain '—ensentiat gambling on the course of the margin. This, of course, is loud echo of affairs in Shanghai!

An authority who has a penchant for figures declares that if only 90 per cent. of the transactions were Speculative and the margin was ten dollars x share, more than $5,000, 000,000—a thousand million pounds sterling and more—was posted with brokers by their customers during the year, in expectation of winning through @ rise in stocks. The brokers also put up a margin and hor-rowed the remainder of the purchase price from the banks or from individuals, the purchased securities naturally being pledged to the lenders as collateral. Brokers' loans in New York at the middle of last December amounted to no less than $4,091,836,303, which was also a record and some $1,000,000,000 higher than the previous January.

Mr, Will Payne, who frankly di clares that this state of affairs is traceable almost entirely to money 1 too easy, and whose opinions may be taken as authori tive, de-blores the trend of Stock Exchange speculation. He ix not alone. Nobody who is in touch with this axpect of the national life of the United States can believe that the gambling prevalent in Grent Britain in the horse-racing category—unfortunate as that may be regarded '<i to be compared with the gam-Bling of this larger sort prevalent throughout this country.—Everybody who bought stocks on a margin in 1927 naturally expected them. fo go up, and on the whole they did rise rather smartly. In December the average price of twenty representative industrial stocks was 196.75 against 158.50 the year before; and of twenty representative railway stocks 142.95 against 118.22 the year before—an advance, as is seen, of some $30 per share.

But, such are the scigantic cor noring possibilities of the immense-strong operators, that it is safe say that most of the speculative buyers—the men who approximate to the Briton at home who take stakes a sovereign on a horse that he knows nothing about—were disappointed at the end of the year.

The present speculation on such fan enormous scale is, however, viewed with disapproval not alone by those who do not directly profit by it or by those who regard it wim ply as form of gambling that it should be curtailed from the moral standpoint. Economists are sounding their alarm, for more specific cally this stock-market speculation involves inflation and it employs a great amount of bank credit that might (theoretically at least) be more profitably used in the produc+ tion of goods and in the real devel lopment of this as yet little-develop. ed country. For while it is po-pulerly supposed that the United States as one great unit is a fully developed region, this is by no means the case—ihere are probably greater possibilities for men with vision in the wide almost untouched areas of many states than have yet been explored.

To Prevent Speculation Total sales of stocks in 1913 on the New York Stock Exchange, as T have said above, were only 83,,693, which proved a record for the century. 'The last year, prior to 1913, in which stocks fell' below 'a hundred millions shares was 1897, which ended what Mr. Payne calls the "hard-times era" that begun in 1893. After making comparison of the extraordinary prosperity of the United States to-day with what was then, Mr. Payne says there is only one cure for excessive speculation—hard times! He then goes to show that in 1913 the United States was a much smaller country. -Building operations were less than fifth as great as Inst year. Bank deposits were $17,279 million (say

'000 (say £10,227,000,000) now, the Latter figure including an amount of savings deposits which is three times that of 1913 Assets of lifo insurance companies, moreover, are to-day three times og large as they were then, and the factory payroll of the country is certainly pretty: near to showing a three-fold growth as well, This was the situation as Mr.

Payne sees it "A very important part of the whole country's bank reserve was. always invested in stock—market call loans. When anything went radically wrong with the stoc'e market, as had happened in 1907, there vas difficulty in recovering those reserves, and banks far from New York resorted to an improvised, extra legal sort of currency called clearing-house certificates in order to pay the cheques of their depositors.

"Country banks kept up a certain reserve in cash in their vaults to meet depositors' de-manda. But cash locked up in bank vault earns nothing. Nae turally the banks wished to carry: no more of it than they were obliged to, Other reserves they sent on to the big Wall Street banks which would pay them round two per cent, on the money Bank reserves piled up in New York. The New York banks had either to keep thig money on hand in cash, in which case it would earn nothing and they could not pay two per cent. Interest on it, or invest it in something that could be turned into cash quickly. The only vestment that met that require ment and was big enough—to absorb the bank surpluses consisted of stock market call loans."

This sort of loan, as every knows, is payable on demand secured by collateral in the form of marketable stocks and shares, The Federal Reserve System In ordinary times the call loans ]worked tolerably well, although a great many people objected principle to putting an important part of the country's bank reserves at the service of speculation of thin kind, But so long as reserves piled up in New York banks and the demanded the only outlet The Fed-feral Reserve stem was expected to do away with much of this Inconvenience, if not ultogethor put an and to that condition, Under that system, banks were required to deposit their legal re" serves, aside from cash in vault, in the Federal Reserve banks of their several districts, and the F. banks were forbidden to make loans fon stock and bond securities, of to discount paper so secured,' excepting Government bonds. "Tha special Bill to this end was dai ed on the one hand to be beneficial to the country's commerce, though fon the other to clog the channels in Wall Street; but it was called "an act of financial. deliverance Jwhich affects the complete banking system of the country from the New York Stock Exchange and Wall Street gambling."

Everybody believed the new system would take bank reserves, to a very important extent, out of the stock market, and make all loans decidedly less popular with country banks. But, as Mr. Payne points font, what we see to-day under the now system—olfering countless ad~ vantages in other directions—is ox erly the opposite result.

The Federal Reserve System, how-lever, is able to check speculation, it is desired, by making money dearer, though in that event legitimate borrowers for legitimate busi ness purposes would have to pay the higher rate. It is ensy credit, ike that which prevailed in 1927, that makes money go into steel market leans. There are two great financial dangers in this country in my opinion—the first is the rapidly growing and already stupendous Durehasing, the second is stock ex= change gam!

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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