Feb.
The Lytton Report agreed that the status quo ante could not be restored in Manchuria, It also held that the new state of Manchuluo could not be considered as called into existence by "a genuine and spontaneous independence movement". The two factors in most effective combination which contributed to the creation of Manchukuo were "the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials both civil and military." Bhe Committee of Nineteen have given a decision conformable with these findings. They will recommend formal record of a refusal to recognise Manchukuo, To all except Japanese partisans this has been the inevitable outcome of the Lytton Commission's findings and, indeed, the actual conditions prevailing in. what was formerly known as the territory of the Three North-Eustern Provinces, to say nothing of Jehol, The world has seen the creation of many states, It would require a diligent search in history to find a parallel for the rapid process by which Japanese: authority sought. first to create an independence movement which did not exist, then to obtain a declaration in favour of independence and finally to erect. 4 new State at Changchun within less than six months of the Mukden putsch. International diplomacy is, at all times, diffident in traversing the stated views of 4 responsible Government in regard to political matters within that Government's special cog-nuisance. Japanese statesmen, however, have tried that amiable convention too high in demon ing outside belief in a theatricality which absorbs the energy! of most arduous Japanese play-acting to convert into even the simulacrum of reality. The very speed ofthe development: of Manchukuio is the measure of its puppet status," Had the original "Peace and Order Preservation Committees" secured real Port from a spontane: ment of the inhabitants of Man-the Japanese authorities could have afforded to wait complacently, From those sympathy and consequently adequate protection, the. fabric, of slowly but cer-} tainly been developed. kal had not promptly repudiated Moreover, if Mr. Yuan Chin-
the notion that his acceptance of the Chairmanship of the Mukden Peace and Order Preservation Committee was anything but the product of bayonet pressure, the Japanese authorities would probably not have troubled to countenance the activities of group of Japanese and Chinese agents who were tentatively ex-Ploiting the prestige of the ex-Emperor Hsuan-tung, now Mi Henry Pu Yi, the Regent of choukuo, Being under no delusions regarding the attitude of the bulk of the Chinese intelligentsia in Manchuria, the Japanese military commanders in Mukden determined to make the best of a bad job by going "all out" in staging as elaborate a pageant of state-building as was ever attempted. All the spade-work was performed by Japanese troops and Japanese officials, assisted by a useful, if not too scrupulous, band of Japanese free lances. The Chinese personnel of the cast was carefully selected. Amiability and respectability were. net neglected, as the choice of Regent and Prime Minister showed. The creation of a Manchukuo Army was attended by considerable difficulty. The broad shoulders lof the sturdy Japanese soldier were capable of bearing its burden, The country has been partly cleared of bandits and uncoordinated Chinese volunteers by the effective action of the Japanese General Staff, sup-Dorted by the magnificent discipline and endurance of the Japanese Army. Japanese officials have addressed themselves with undeniable zeal and ability to the task of organising the civil administration. But they and the Japanese Army stilt but. tress the infant "State" which could not stand for a single moment without their complete dominance of every detail of its organisation. All this is said less in ridicule than in admiration of men who, in single-minded devotion to an idea, have annexed and are trying to bring under control a vast area in which their own country has special interest. If only on account of the parlous state bf the Manchurian currency in September 1931, the efforts of these Japanese' adventurers deserve sympathetic appreciation. In the annexure to the Lytton Report it is stated:
"The author unacquainted with: any instance in recent times Where a Government has so ruthlessly systematically and over so long @ period of time exploited und taxed its own peoples in stich 8 disgraceful manner as have the former officials, with th 1 exception of those ie been as mindful of their mor obligation to provide their peoples with a respectable currency" or ies as they were zealous of their sovereign rights to pro vide such currencies as they chose, they, and their peoples and their neighbours would have fared far differently and better, Ithough' the Report was sceptical of the ability of the Japanese to effect any real reform, owing to the meagreness of the resources placed at the disposal, of the new "Manchukuo" Bank, it could not have more emphatic cally endorsed the justice of Japanese contentions regarding the state of affairs in Manchuria eighteen months ago. It will be agreed that, in such conditions, the Japanese authorities were decidedly ill-advised to impose ona grim reality the trappings of a stage display to which no, serious critic could give credence.
It is early yet definitely to gauge Japan's attitude towards the Committee's refusal to recog.
Manchukuo. Plainly the Government at Tokyo has the de-citing voice. Public opinion in Japan will take of Manchukuo, exactly the view expressed well-organised demonstrations. with which the Manchue'an. issue has been associated, Mukden or Tokyo, for the Inst year and more. Even the most ardent apologist for Japan' will iiarJly deny that, as was pointed out yesterday, the precipitate re-ion' of Manchukuo last September was unjustified by claim of urgency. It, appeared to be and surely was a desperate gamble, in the hope that the League would be either overawed or bewitched. So spe-curative an action need not be invested with the glamour of prestige. Its non-acceptance on the basis claimed for it must have been a probability foreseen from the start, The Japanese Government should regard the Committee's decision in that prosaic light. Melodrama is unnecessary. It may be contended that Japan can make the decision an excuse for ignoring the League altogether and carrying out the project of, withdrawal. Although cynics might with reason remark that! Japanese action in Manchuria has not been distinguished by, any particular solicitude for the League's wishes, it is equally pertinent to argue that Japan would not have made such strenuous efforts to put her case at Geneva had she been entirely neglectful of the force of world-opinion as crystallized there. Moreover, the Lytton findings, forming as they do the basis of the League's general attitude, should not discourage the best.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.