Nor. 2, The opening of the Central Bank of China is fraught with great possibil ities, It starts with abundant ex lence to draw upon and vi examples the past of wha impress one on the whole favourabl The Court of Directors a larger proper of business men with possible advantage, but the Super-balance by having six business nd_only one Government, The very obvious desire is to keep the Bank wholly under Government control. Time alone n show whether thi plan or not, We nee more than has already been of keeping all politics strictly out of the Bank's offs Failure on this supreme essential was the downfall of similar' enterprises in the past. We may believe that the intention of the Bank's promoters is, by keeping all appointments in Government hands, to ensure the selection of men who shall be above suspicion. It only remains to secure them against the sort of pressure from without which, in moments of crisis, is only too likely to be attempted. The strictness of the re eschewing all activities that might have the least suspicion of a speculative nature is worth noting. The Bank is not meant to cut into the work of other banks. But it does propose to control that which is the founda. tion of all banking, paper and ithe keynote of the North, From the Yangtze come reports of improving conditions and a generally better state of foehn, while Hongkong and Canton appear almost jubilant. Only in Shanghai, it would seem, do doubt and foreboding still hold their ground.
To shut one's eyes to what is amiss would be folly nor would it benefit anyone, certainly not China, to act as if the thing that m one day be were Jalready the thing that is But there is a good deal on the credit side and the Nationalists have come through the iminer better 1 was expected, Ci isos have id. arisen which at the moment seemed to threaten inevitable shipwreck, but somehow they were overcome. Differences within the party, which have at times been acute, have never Jactuatly come to an open breach and every day that passes enables passion to cool and reason to regain sway. The new model of Government has proved a disappointment to many Chinese and a system which subordinates everything to the will of a party i to do a great deal elf. On the other id times out -Jof number that the only thing which can save China is a diet worship so that it is iMogical to complain because the dictator is party and not a man, especially as no one man could attempt to control all China, whereas the party can at least claim subser-vince to the principles for which it stands in all provinces. The absurdities of the San Min.
Chu I are more conspicuous to non-Chinese than its merits.
But undoubtedly it contains in the almost daily worship of the late Leader, they meet on common ground. That is something new in China and if open quarrels can be avoided—against which these common principles are an undoubted eafeguard—it told, will not hold herself bound by any agreement Mr. Hussey Freke, the Associate Chief Inspector, has made." In conjunction with this, the "North China Standard" of Peking, which is generally believed to have clo: affiliations with Japanese interest, was quoted in our Thursday's issue as saying that the new arrangement "makes no provision for any surplus" on the salt revenues on which Japan has a claim: "a surplus, under the alleged new plan, does not hence there will be no payment of interest into. the sinking fund for the $96,000,000 loan in which Japan is con learned. Mr, Hussy-Freke's position is therefore regarded as extremely precarious.." Whether this means Mr. Hussy-Freke's own tenure of office, or the posi= tion of his agreement for pay ment of interest on salt loans, we do not know. Nor does it greatly matter, because, actual fact, there is no reason why either should be endangered.
The agreement mentioned was made at the end of September. Under it $10,000,000 is to be set aside annually from salt revenues against payment of i terest on the Loan of 1898, the Anglo-F' Loan of 1908, the Tw i ways and the Birch-Crisp loans; and a list was published of how much each collectorate was to pay in order to make up the amount, the money being deposited in banks specified by the Ministry of Finance. Now this last condition is a departure from previous practice, under which the Group banks received all salt revenues, paid out charges on loans' secured on them and handed the balance to the Chinese Government, the object of the Ministry of Finance being to avoid anything that savoured of a debt-receiver ship. The principle here volved might.be ground for a Protest by the Legations of the
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.