A few days after August 8, 1918, summoned a Crown Council, in order to get a clear conception of the situation and to draw therefrom the necessary conclusions upon which to base the policy to be followed by Count Hertling. The Chief Military, Command approved the idea that the Imperial Chancellor should keep in sight the possibility of getting into closer touch with the enemy, but laid stress on the necessity of first occupying the Siegfried Line and there thoroughly beating off the foe, and on the fact that negotiations must not begin before this ocewred. Thereupon I directed that the Chancellor get into communication with a neutral power—the Netherlands—in order to ascertain whether it was ready to undertake such a step toward mediation.
What rendered the contemplated action through Dutch channels very diffeult was that Austria could not be brought to a definite agreement, but continually postponed the declaration which had been requested of her. Even a verbal agreement given to me by the Emperor Charles was afterward broken by him under Burian's influence.
The Dutch government had al: ready been informed by me and hid signified its readiness to act. Meanwhile, Austria, without notifying us, made her first separate peace offer, which set the ball rolling. The Emperor Charles hud indeed got into touch secretly with the Entente and had long since resolved to abandon us. He acted according to the plan which he had explained thus to his entourage: "When I ge to the Germans, I agree to everything they say, and when'[ return home, I do whatever I please.'
Thus it happened that my government and I were constantly deceived by actions in Vienna, without being able to do anything against it, since from there we constantly received the hint: If you make things hard for us, we Shall leave you in the lurch; in other words, our army will no longer fight by your side." In view of our situation, such action on Austria's part had to be avoided in any way possible, both on military and political grounds.
The defection of Hungary and Austria brought a crisis upon us. Had Emperor Charles kept contro) of his nerves for three weeks longer, many things would have turned out differently. But Andrassy—as he himself admitted—had been negotiate ing for a long time im Switzerland, behind our backs, with the Entente. Thus Emperor Charles believed that he would assure himself of good treatment at the hands of the Entente.
After our failure of August 8, General Ludendorff had declared that he could no longer guarantee a military victory.. Therefore, the preparation of peace negotiations was
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