Thus England, France and Russia had, though for different rear gons, an aim in common, viz.: to overthrow Germany, England wished to do so for commercial-political reasons, France on account of her policy of revenge, Russia because she was @ satellite of France and also for reasons of internal politics and because she wished to reach the southern sea. These three great nations, therefore, were bound to act together. The union of these ambitions in a common course of action, duly planned, is what we call the policy of encirclement.
Added to all this there was also the gentleman's agreement which has only recently come to light and has already been thoroughly discusssd in the '"Hohenlohe" chapter concerning this agreement I knew absolutely. nothing during my reign, and the German Foreign Office was only superficially and unreliably informed.
When I learned of it, I immediately sought information about it from Herr von Bethmann. He wrote me, a rather puzzling letter, ta the effect that there was surely something about it among the documents of the Foreign Office; that the German Ambassador at that time in Washington, von Holleben, had made some confidential report on it, to be s re, but bad not given his source of information, wherefore the Foreign Office had not attached any importance to the matter and had not reported fu1- ther on it to me. Hence the said agreement had actually no influence upon Germany's policy, but it constitutes supplementary proof that the Anglo-Saxon world as far back as 1897 had combined against us, and thereby explains a number of obstacles encountered by Germany in her foreign policy. It also explains America's attitude in the war, We were quite well saquainted, on the other hand, with the En-toute Cordiale, its foundations and purposes, and it decisively influenced the course of our policy.
In view of the grouping of England, France and Russia—three very atrong powere—only one poii-
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.