Taking up once more our relations\with England, we did everything in our power to bring about rapprochement; we consented to the demand for limitation of naval construction, as I have shown in my report of Haldane's visit +o Berlin. I went so far as to try to utilize my family connexions. But in vain. The actions of King Edward VII. are explained by the simple fact that he was an Englishman and was trying to bring to realization the plans of his Government. Maybe the political ambitions of the King, who did not gin to reign until] well along in years, contributed to this.
We certainly did all that was possible to meet England half way, but it was useless, because the German export figures showed an increase; naturally we could not limit our world commerce in order to satisfy England. That would have been asking too much.
As regards our policy toward England, we have been much blame ed for having refused the offer of an alliance made us by Chamberlain, the English Colonial Minister, toward the close of the nineties. This matter, however, was far d: fferent in character, on closer in: spection, from what it was represented as being.
First, Chamberlain brought a. letter with him from the English Premier, Salisbury, to Biilow, in which the English Prime Minister declared that Chamberlain was dealing on his own account only, that the English Cabinet was not behind him. This, to be sure, might have meant the adoption of a course that was diplomatically permissible, giving the English Cabinet, which was responsible to Parliament, a free hand; bnt it turned out later, be it remarked, that the Liberal group in England was at that time hostile to a German-English alliance.
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that there was a possibility that the course ad was ® mere er reproduction prohibited without permission. diplomatic formaljty—that Chamberlain might have been sent on ahead and complete freedom of action retained for the English Cabinet, which is_a favourite method in London—Prince Biilow, with my consent, went thoroughly into the matter with Chamberlain.
It transpired then that the English-German alliance was aimed unquestionably against Russia. Chamberlain spoke directly about a war to be waged later by England and Germany against Russia Prince Ritlow, in full agreement with me, declined politely but emphatically thus to disturb the peace of Europe. In so doing he was but following the example of the great Chancellor, for Prince Bismarck coined the phrase—I myself have heard it repeatedly in the Bismarck family circle: "Germany must never become England's dagger on the European continent."
So we did nothing further at that time than to go straight ahead with our policy, viz.: we refused all agreements which might lead to a war which was not based directly on the defence of our native soil, The refusal of the Chamberlain offer is a proof of the German love of peace.
As to France, we sought to bring about an endurable state of affairs. This was difficult, for, in Frenen eyes, we were the arch-enemy and it was impossible for us to quiesce in the demands inspired by the policy of revenge. We settled the Morocco quarrel peacefully; no man of standing in Germany entertained the idea of war on account of Morocco. For the sake of peace we allowed Fiance at that time to encroach upon the essentially Iegitimate interests of Germany in Morocco, strengthened as the French were by the agreement con-eluded secretly with England as io mutual compensation in Egypt and Morocco.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.