I subordinated my own interest: and those of my dynasty, which certainly were not unimportant, and forced myself, after the severest inward struggles, to acquiexe in the wish of the German authorities. Later it transpired that the German Government had obtained no real guarantees. But, in the tumultuous sequence of events during those days, it was necessary for me to consider the unequivocal and_ definite announcement of the Imperial Chancellor as authoritative. For this reason I did not investigate it.
Why the Entente demanded, through Mr. Wilson, that I should abdicate is now obvious. *I felt perfectly sure that, following my being dispossessed of the throne, military and political instability would necessarily ensue in Germany and enable it to force upon Germany not easier but harder terms. At that time the revolution had not yet appeared as an aid to the Entente.
For me to have remained on the throne would have seemed to the Entente mors advantageous tw Germany than my abdication. I myself agree with this view of the Entente, now that it has turned out that the Max of Baden Government had no substantial fou..dation for its declaration that my abdication would bring better terms to my fatherland.
I go even further and declare that the Entente would never have dared to offer such terms to an intact German Empi-e It would not have dared to offer them to an imperial realm upon which the parliamentary system had not yet been forced, with the help of German Utopians, at the very moment of its final fight for existence; to a realm whose monarchical Government had not been deprived of the power to command its army and navy.
In view of all this, heavy guilt also lies on the shoulders of the American ex-President as a result of his having demanded my abdication under the pretence that it would bring Germany better terms Here also we certainly have a point of support for the powerful lever which is destined to drag the Treaty of Versailles from where it lies behind lock and key. In Germany, however, Mr. Wilson should never be confused with the American people.
In setting forth my political principles in what follows I am actuated solely by a desire to contribute toward proving Germany's innocence of having brought on the World War.
From the outset of my reign German policy was based upon compromise of the differences which it found existing between nations. In its entirely, therefore, my policy was eminently. peaceful. This policy of peaceful compromise became apparent in internal politics, at the very beginning of my reign, in the legislation desired by me. for the protection of the workers. The development of social legisla tion, which placed Germany at the|deeply involved in the Boer War head of civilized -nations in the domain of governmental protection, was based on a like foundation.
The fundamental idea of a policy of compromise went so far within Germany that the strength of the army would have remained far less than universal compulsory military service and the size of the popu lation made possible. Here, as well as in the matter of naval construction, the curtailments demanded by the Reichstag were pub up with by the Crown and the Government. Already at that time the question of Germany's capabilities of defence was left to the decision of the people's representatives. A nation that wished and prepared war would have adopted quite different tactics.
INADEQUATE PREPAREDNESS, The more apparent the Entente's policy of encirclement and attack became, the more the means of protecting our welfare should have been strengthened for defensive reasons. This idea of natural and justified self-protection, by means of defensive measures against a possible hostile attack, was carried out in a wretchedly inadequate manner.
Germany's desire for peace, in fact, was unable to develop this protection by land and sea in a manner compatible with her financial and national strength and with the risk which our welfare was bound to run in case of a way'. Therefore, we are now suffering not from the consequences of the tendency toward aggression falsely imputed to us, but actually from the consequences of a well-nigh incredible love of peace and blind confidence.
The entirely different political principles of the Entente have already been described by me, also our continuous efforts to get upon friendly terms with the individual Entente nations, I do not wish to ignore completely the less important work done by Germany, also included within the framework of politics on a large scale, which was always inspired by the same purpose: to effect compromise of existing points of conflict. The Kiel Sa aratte brought us guests from all the leading nations. We sought compromise with the same zeal on the neutral territory of sport as in the domain of science by means of exchange professors, and foreign officers were most willingly allowed to inspect our army system. This latter might be adjudged a mistake, now that we can look back, but, in any event, all these honest desire to live at peace with points are certain proofs of our
all.
Moreover, Germany did not take advantage of a single one of the opportunities that arose for waging war with a sure prospect of success.
I have already pointed out the benevolent neutrality of Germany Russia at the time of the Russo-Japanese War.
At the time when England was
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.