Jan, 11.
The difficulty of America's continued abstention, from mem bemmhip of the League of Nations receives pointed illustration. in the situation which has arisen ovey the Manchurian issue. doubt Washington's intention is of og extravagant as some ex-Ponents, would suggest. The tate Department is as well-informed as other Foreign Offices the actual facts of the Japanese position. The relations between Japan and the United: States of America have been of the friendliest description, It may be assumed therefore that the cumbrous procedure of a formal Note drawing attention fo. the Nine-Power Treaty would dot have teen employed had; America been in the same fore tunate state as France and Great Britain who, apart trom_ their] ordinary diplomatic understandings with Japan and China, can ly om thely membership of the League, to which Japan" also Ddelongs, for suitable enforcement of their views. Naturally the flamboyant interpretation placed the Note in some quarters has aroused feeling in Japan, where the ill-advised attempt to asso ciate America with the procead-{nga of the Council of the League 4 few weeks ago was rightly and vehemently criticised. At' the same time it s that, as America is to be represented the Commission of Inquiry, the State Department should fect it Recessary to issue what, on the mildest construction, must be re garded as a warning. "Itis quite Understandable that the Powers should desire to be fully advised the. trend of Japan's policy in Manchuria, As this journal ha Pointed out, the apparent me compatibility of the pronounce. ments of the Japanese Government with "some of" the claims put forward from les
Japanese sources, particularly responsible but hardy negligible those in close touch with the Army in Manchuria, invites in-wiry. "From the statements of the Foreign Offices at Whitehall and the Quai WOrsay, it would Feem that inquiry has been made and satisfied, with the reserva tion that such moderating infidence as is required will be Th reised through the League, United States of America lently considers that she is differently situated. It will be recalled that President Hoover's Mussage to Congress, on December 10, affirmed, in Yegard to Manchuria, a responsibility for maintaining the integrity of China but, in indicating a conviction that the wise and appropriate course seemed rather to aid and advise with the League, and thus have unity of effort td maintain peace than to take independent action, emphasised the consistent, preservation by the State Department of "complete freedom of judgment and action aso pariipation in any measures which might fin detomined upon." a Recourse now to independent action derives its sanction plainly from that statement of American policy. It is permissible to suggest that the special position of America inspires this revi of the attitude originally adopt-President Hoover—or rather this invocation of the saving clause of his declara Great Britain and France are under no such disadvantages. If Moir full contact with the "gue had been ignored and an attempt been made by them to, teat the Manchurian issue at! this stage on more portentous ines, they would have raised most delicate questions. At a most menaced by the inherent defects of the internal administration of the country, it would invidious to on one particular signatory of the Nine er Treaty special responsbilities for preserving that elusive quality. Japan _has [agreed, in due course, to assist ithe League's Commission of Inquiry in establishing the facts] of recent events in Manchuri The admittedly awkward circumstances that certain Japanese factions, in precipitation of those! events, were prima facie out of accord with the principles underlying membership of the League of Nations, cannot be allowed to! have a preponderating. influence on assessments. of the situation. Let it be conceded that the! Army in Manchuria has definite-_ led where it should have been directed, that Japanese _propaganda has been singularly' inept and unwise in certain aspects, and that the Government at Tokyo has allowed its case to statements of policy, there stil be prejudiced by conflicting must remain the spectacle of Manchuria grossly misgoverned, bled white by reckless deprecia. tion of currency to the point of imposing the servitude of cruel, invisible taxation, and helplessly caught up in the web of a system of administration which, by the circumlocutory methods of its neophytes, put premium on irresponsibility and complete negligence. That is why the Council of the League of Nations, after the case had been brought to its cognisance, ised the danger of am out-of-han judgment, Since the agreed resolution was passed in Paris the situation has lost none of those complicate ing characteristics, The Government of China which refused to' read the writing on the wall in the earlier months of 1931 when its own Minister at Tokyo warned it of the seriousness of delay in attending to Japanese representations and the churian authorities. themselves, for all their incapacity, were trying to convince Nanking, that provocation of Japanese indignation was impolitic, to. use ino stronger term, has.' fallen. Whatever claim it may have had to be able ta fulfil the functions of a central administration has: not yet been fully established in favour of its successor. Indeed recent reports indicate that the head of the new Government looks to the man whom he helped to eject for guidance in the present grave crisis. Manchuria seems far away in this gathering of the storm clouds over the Yangtsze. If the League! had taken the headlong course of looking exclusively to events in Mukden—or now in Chinchow—it would have found itself in the embarrassing position of having expended its energies on the stipport of an entity which, to say the least of it, had a most, fragile constitution.—However} much Japan's action of Septem: ber 18 is deplored or, even, condemned, it must be ' recognised that she was faced with a most difficult decision. In the Hight of subsequent events it may be argued that she acted with unnecessary—precipitancy.. It can hardly be pretended that she did not in a great measure ensure the extrication of Manchuria from the plight of being! involved in a yet further dislocation of China's administrative fabric. That the Japanese Army leannot solve the Manchurian problem is plain. How soon the Jap-_ anese Government can impress that point on its policy is a disturbing question to answer. It) may be assumed however that, having regard to the general position in China, Great Britain and France are content to believe that Japanese assurances will be xtheoming at the appropria time. Here again the League's usefulness is revealed. It sets as a lightning conductor. Last month Six John Simon stated that British policy was based on loyal ce-operation with the League. Both Great Britain and France have thus rallied to support of the League at a time when, awing to the complexity of the Manchurian issue and te the errors Of inexperience discernible in.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.