The progress made by the new administration in Manchuria has been critically examined in the series of articles by this journal's Peking correspondent who has recently made an extended tour of the country. The last article appears to-day, It will be recognized that Mr. Lewisohn has covered the ground with conscientious thoroughness and has presented valuable material_on which to form an appreciation of the actual situation. He has not omitted expound some of the foibles of the Japanese arbiters of Manchou-eno's destiny. Nor has he fallen {nto the error of treating those foibles too seriously. After all they do not affect the main consideration, whether the people of Manchuria "are likely. to obtain reasonable security in developing its resources and, in so doing, to enjoy a greater measure of pros perity than in the past. As he Tightly has pointed out, the terrlble evil of an insidious taxation of the farmer by means of the Aepreciated feng piao, has Leen removed. On that ground. alone the Japanese have deserved well of the Manchurian agriculturist.
As for the prevalence of banditry—political or otherwise—it is clear that there is firmer ground for expecting it to be suitably tackled lurider the present regime than in the conditions which still exist certain outlying parts of China: Even if the Chinese wno form by far the greater part of the popula~ tion of Manchuria, are disinclined to be wildly enthusiastic about their Japanese masters, they may be taken to prefer the present ills than to fy to others of which they probably consider they nave vivid and accurate memories. The situation has not changed, in this respect, from that of the autumn of 103i, when Impressions of the "'Manchiurlan Medley" were ven {n these columns, also as the result of a personal tour, shortly after the Mukden incident of September of that year. Moreover, this point of view was later endorsed with some emphasis by the Lytton Report's insistence on the impos~ sibility of restoring the status quo While the Japanese are proceed-{ing to deal with the administrative and economte problems of Man churia, the political issue is being canvassed by the world outside, as well as by foreigners within the country itself. The Japanese—as this Journal had occasion to point out a few weeks back—are by no means insistent on the settlement of that issue, Officially Tokyo is not backward in pointing out the awkward implications of con-recognition", when such specific imcultics as the all monopoly or other trading complication arise. Probably the advantages of "rec-cognition" are tar too eagerly accepted by foreign business" men Iaudably anxious to leave no stone unturned to find more customers, Certainly "recognition" is warmly advocated by those who, all along, have resented any sort of criticism of the Mukden incident and the adventures which arose from it. Unfortunately the issue is not as simple as all that, Moreover it one with which the Chinese Government is—or should be— intimately concerned. Assisted. by a not unreasonable Japanese diplomacy, Chinese Government representatives have been -able skilfully to arrive at a settlement of the railway, fiscal, and post-relations with' Manchuria, without prejudicing the political issue of the status of Manchoukuo. Further than that, at present, the Chinese Government is unlikely to bbe able to go. No good is done by attempting to endorse the painfully-thin ex post facto argu-rent that Japanese action in 1931 ved Manchuria from anarch; Tt is useless, of course, at this stage to regret that Japan did not first lay before the League of Nations the sum of her admitted grievances in Manchuria and so, in the event of not receiving: redress, cleared herself of any imputation of breach of faith as the result of independent action jin that regard. The truth must be that the Japanese Government. itself did not perceive or assume any imminent breakdown. Indeed. the situation in September 1931 was neither better nor worse than. it had been for some eighteen months. If anything, there were signs of a slow but definite attempt Jon the part of the then prevailing regime to tackle the problem of its own defects in government. The Mukden putsch was staged with one object: not to vindicate the of administration in but to substitute a militarist for the Shidehara policy in the counsels of Japan. It suc~ ceeded beyond the wildest hopes of its authors who soon found themselves in so favourable a position that they were hardly concerned to justify the clumsily manufactured story of the blowing up of the railway line on the night of September 18, 1931. Moreover, their immediate objective in Tokyo was closely bound up with their ultimate objective of preparing to erect a massive bulwark against possible dangers from the other side of the Great Khingan Moun-tams.
Japan holds that the League of Nations failed to give due recognition to the excellence of her Intentions in Manchuria, and was misled by the findings of the Commission of Inquiry for which she herself had asked at Geneva.
Even if that contention be sccepted, it has always seemed re-grottable that Japan, by withdrawing her countenance from the League, has made the process of enlightenment all the more ¢iffcult. By proceeding from one species of camouflage to another, Japan has continued to complicate the diplomatic issues involved. Annexation of Manchuria in the full sense of the term may be inconvenient. It has been avoided, some maintain, on the ground of expense. Yet, in the long run, the economic commitments under the present system may well tally as closely with those of annexation as the "independence" of Manchoukuo tallies with incorporation in the Japanese Empire. Mr. Lewisohn's plain exposition of Manchurfan polity must surely disabuse any mind of the possibility of regarding Manchoukuo as leither independent at the moment oF possessed of the germs of independence for future display. Therefore, it is difficult to see what formula can be devised for according it "recognition." On the other hand, as the League is formally committed to the impracticability of restoring the status quo there seems to be every reason for holding that the League, with China's concurrence and Japan's assist ance, can prescribe a remedy for Manchuria's present political invisibility. Let Japan lay to her soul the flattering unction that she has been instrumental in giving Geneva salutary instruction. The League has learnt much in recent years. Tt has lately shown the benefit of this instruction with the result that its prestige has markedly revived. There reed, therefore, be no preparation of, white sheets or stools of repentance, since hardly any single natio: in the world to-day could avoid can-@idature for those uncomfortable symbols. The Japanese Government has shown a statesmanlike appreciation of the advantage of ce-operating in the League's nonpolitical activities, even in this fast Tapsing period of the withdrawal notice. Looking at recent ten doneies in Europe, is it not possible for Japan to consider the practicality of solving the international relations of Manchoukuo by resuming her full membership of the League? Her achievements in Manchuria have received a generous measure of esteem. The world has gone through so many anxious moments in the last four years that broad vision is likely to te more firmly encouraged than meticulous scrutiny of poinc; of detail. So long as fundamental principles are safeguarded, statesmanship is not inclined to dally over the technique of pettifoggery. Equally, however, the world has Tearnt enough to'know that lasting solution. of its problems
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.