N." and containing statements regarding the subject matter of this prosecution, avowedly prepared for use in this case, The letter has been formally acknowledged and given a place in our archives and, were it an ordinary communication between officials, that would end the matter. But when we are asked, as we are by defendant's counsel, to receive it regularly as evidence in this cause and to base the judgment of this Court thereon, we must inquire whethergit meets the requirements of the well settled probatory rules under which the Court is required to operate. One of the most fundamental of those rules is the following:
"The mode of proof in the trial of actions at common law shall be by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court, except as - hereinafter provided."
"As hereinafter provided" the only exception is by deposition. A well known author states the common law rule as follows:
"The certificate of a public officer, no matter how high and solemn his office, is inadmissible to prove any disputed fact.
The officer, if living, must be produced to swear to the fact.
If he be dead his official entries, made in the discharge of his duties, may be evidence. if the object is to prove that a fact appears by record the record itself must be exemplified or produced. His certificate, however, being of the nature of hearsay, and er parte is in itself inadmissible."
We have examined all of defendant's references and fail to find any decision which qualifies this doctrine. That "the certificate of the Secretary of State is evidence to prove the diplomatic character of a person accredited as a minister by the government of the United States," while not expressly decided in the case referred to falls clearly within the doctrine; for there the object was "to prove that a fact appeared by record"—7.e. the fact of an official's appointment. So an Admiral's report (by letter) to the Navy Department regarding another naval officer, becOmes part of a public record and either the original or an authenticated copy is admissible. But the situation would have been very different had that Admiral prepared a communication regarding the fact involved in a pending case and caused it to be transmitted to the trial court. It is quite within the rule to receive, in a boundary dispute, the minutes of town commissioners who had fixed the boundary; for the minutes were part of a public record. In the earliest case cited by defendant's counsel the trial court rejected the letters of the public agent offered in evidence. On appeal, two of the four justices expressed the opinion that they should have been received but the others did not concur and as the Court was divided no writ issued. Surely that is not a precedent for the wide departure from the general rule asked in the present _instance. For if this defendant may obtain evidence, not subject to oath or cross-examination by merely writing to a public official through a Consulate, any other litigant may do the same and the very foundations of judicial proof as we know it under-the Anglo-American system would be impaired. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the United States Attorney's further objection that the document is not sufficiently authenticated.
As we have seen, the general exception to this requirement of testimony in open court is by deposition, Where the witness is beyond the Court's jurisdiction the mode -of taking, is by commission and in this instance the proposed witness; net being of American nationality, is as much beyond the jurisdiction as if he resided in another country, Of course, such a commission could not issue in behalf of the prosecution ina criminal case, for that would impair the defendant's right of confrontation. But, while the Supreme Court seems never to have passed on this question, there are several instances where District Courts have issued commissions in such a case.
In one of these, an exceptiona]- ly able trial Judge (McCrary) observed "Under the terms of the statute a dedimus may issue in any case where it is necessary, in order to prevent a failure or delay of justice.' not in any civil case, nor in. any case at common law, in equity or admiralty, but in any case' which includes crimine] as well as civil proceedings Sound policy undoubtedly de-
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.