Tue, Navas, Mesos or Apsunat or Funy Sim Race Kevis-—The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 1910-1915, With Maps and Mlustrations. Thorn: ton Butterworth, London.
In a somewhat rambling political preface the gallant author "admits that his general education ceased when he joined H.MS. Britannia at the tender age of twelve. He describes the surprise of his French naval friends who "wondered how 1 could have found time to win such high scholastic distinction" as 10 merit the honours of the Scottish and. English universities which—were thrust upon him at the close of the war! The book has a racy style and there is about ita touch of the sea, but it Is very obvious that the an thor's sword is much mightier than The pre-war memoirs mostly consist an account of the development of the submarine, There is the usual wordifying Lora Fisher-Lord Charles Beresford episode. In this case the young Keyes nearly had his career Brematurely blasted owing to the faint resemblance of his name to friend of Lord Charles. Beresford's who was suspected, unjustifiably a9 it happened, of communicating to the press matter rather unfriendly (o the Inighty Fisher, One may well wonder how many. careers which might have been useful to the na-Hon were sacrificed owing to the Fisher-Beresford intrigues. The author is obviously not unnaturally fanti-Fisher to the end: but for all that he gives him full credit. for being "one of the greatest producers. of materiel in the history of the country'
"At the outset _of the war, Commodore Keyes saw most of the 1914 skirmishing in the North Sea and gives a 00d, though to the lay mind somewhat involved account, partiularly of the part played by his Beloved submarines. " In October, 1918, he ce-operated with the i-tated Antwerp. Expedition. The real interest of the book begins, however, in February, 1918, when he went to be Chief of the Staff to the Naval Forces engaged in "the greatest am-philan enterprise in the history, of the world"—the attack on the Dardanelles.
Th a foreword to this part of the book, "Admiral Keyes ives an Count. of Admiral Duckworth's fore-ingot the Straits In 1007 and. of its Inglorious ending. 'Far from adopting the general view that this should have been suticlent warning of the ity "of entering "the. Marmora with foips alone, the author claims That Duckworth': experiences. only to show how opportunities, might Srisused ina amilar_ operation, He "claims that' Drake, Hawke of Netson would have carried the operation to. a. glorious conclusion, are left with the impression that Inthe, last war Keyes, ihe" had been in "command, might have Brought it ea successful. conclusion Pepo at what a cost and the element chance was 20 great that after the firt unsuccessful tempt of March i016, the Lords of the Admiralty were, probably: right. in refusing Coumtekunce a. second unsupported Saval atnck, Not so Admiral Keyes.
the biter end, after the for oval attack and countess itary Allempis to get astride Ube peninsula fad tailed, even after evacuation bad been agreed upon, he insists that an Qemupported naval attack upon the Steals would succeed, though in one Sizee'ne pute the probable Tosses at Feven ut of twelve battleships. He {tulsa pon the world-wide politico freet of'tre arrival in the Marmora SES pruish fet and scots at the Saea that they mist have beer mo Salty ere usuppored, than Maga' atrial sory of the attempt to (agquien sabe
take Constantinople by frontal attack veen told and retold, and there BMlutie new inthe telling by Admiral Heyen of the actual attempt and its Melotisas ending, except his, persist tite (hora: Kitchener desorbed. him fon "most persistent young man") that one more naval attack would do the job. Prom his telling the whole campaign remains what It has seem-most of us, series of episodes marvellous personal courage and endurance, but of oftelal mismanagement. he only successful part was the evacuation, and for that we take off our hats to Commodore Keyes and ils gaitant naval comrades Admiral. Keyes dlamisses the great uuntupported. naval attack. of March 1 in one chapter and. attributes its feature and the lus of four battleships to the inefieleney or worse of the 'Those mines and the inectency of our sweepers at that time were the toe ents othe failure of the Fieet'te force a pasangt throws the Dardanties and' carry out the tack with bleb the Admiralty had been hanged But "the renponaibility "for the'timate faure of the Peto force a passage through the Dardcneltov les on the shoulders of these who tould'not low us to seeompish out tank arter the cause of our check had been lscovered and cient anes Evapors bad been provided Tn'these sentences 1s summed up the remainder of the book. Admiral, or Commodore as he was then, Keyes. tried by all the means in his power between March and December to prevail upon his chiefs, naval, military' oF civilian, to let the Navy have one more try.' If he had been allowed, doubtless he would have antedated his glorious adventures at Zeebrugge: but" would he have succeeded in knocking Turkey out of the war, as he so confidently expected, and as apparently he still believes he could have done?
There was one question to which! they demand" an "answer..—.- What would happen ifthe Fleet ai, into the Marmora and the Turkish defence id "not "collapse... replied. that Was the Government's concern-...but "we had Jo withdraw we would without any great hazard..."
The gallant landings at Anzac and Suvla and the subsequent fighting and failure to advance are well and sym pathetically described. "Ty is obvious that all the time Keyes was expecting that another naval attack would be countenanced and great must have been his disappointment as month followed month and the navy was: more and more drawn into the work: of rationing or transporting the armies rather than fighting alongside them 'oF alone.
In November the winter storms are at hand, 'Keyes goes {0 London to try to persuade Lord Balfour, who now rales in the place' of the peluous Winston Churchill, Balfour sympathetic, but reminds the Commodore that he is a "constitutional minister" and must be guided by his professional advisers, the Lords of, the Admiralty. One wonders what. would have been Keyes' fate if he! had found the less constitutional Winston still First Lord. The Lords of the Admiralty will not agree, so, unabated in vigour, the "Commodore "K", declaring that he will never evacuate Gallipoli, goes: out to Mudros. By a series of unfortunate mistakes Keyes loses the opportunity of travelling with him, and, as he feels convinced, convincing When he arrives again at the Dar-dandles, Lord Kitchener has been convinced in the other direction, the decision to evacuate has been practi cally taken. Keyes is too late. The rest of the bool two! last chapters, And After," are the outpourings of the soul of a brave man trying to force his opinions upon others perhaps not tess brave buy older and! more cat-
The story of the evacuation is well and modestly told. We know how much the army owed to the navy, and to Keyes in particular, that the evacuation, contrary to universal fore bodings, was carried out successfully and without appreciable loss.
The last paragraph of the book fives cause for thought and is worth quoting: the light of our knowledge to-day can anyone doubt that. the forcing. the Dardanelles would have shortened the war by two years and spared Mterally' millions of lives?
Personally we do doubt it; but we look forward to the next volume of these memoirs.—n.a.se.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.