Oct. 8
The development of Italy's campaign in Ethiopia has yet to be Jcompletely revealed. The capture Jof Adowa has been effected according to long-laid plans. Its sentimental significance for Italy is great. How far it is of real importance from a military point of view jean be judged only when the strategy of the Italian General Staff finds clearer expression. The open-Sing stages of the war have been marked by familiar—episodes. Rumour, ever more active than in-{tclligence reports, has contradicted itself several times. Accounts of desperate fighting have to be dis counted until accepted figures of the casualties are available. The uncertainty of the means of communication leads to a possibly genuine misreading of events. An outpost brush becomes magnified into an engagement. One side Jdcliberately withdraws from a certain point; its occupation immediately is hailed as a significant victory by the other. In addition' misuse of the Red Cross flag is: alleged against the Ethiopians by' [the Italians who, in their turn, are accused of bombing hospitals' and' killing women and children from. the air. All that emerges from the shadowy realm in which specul tion, propaganda and mystification. are mingled with a grain or two of reliable information. The Italians have a preponderating advantage in the perfection of their modern military machine. Not the least is their possession of overwhelming. Jdominance of the air. With vir~ tually no opposition their aircraft can reduce the Bthiopians' con-jacalment of movements to the barest minimum. There is nothin prevent the organization of methodical advance, rectified leach turn by the careful observa~ tions of reconnoitring airmen. On the other hand the Ethiopians' lack. lof air-power enables the Italians to preserve an almost impenetrable secrecy regarding their prepers tions. This is of special importance In the maintenance of communica~ tions and the unbroken provision of supplies for keeping the troops in condition and thus mitigating the grim asperities of the climate and terrain.
Obviously the Ethiopian plan of campaign will be based on guerulla tactics. Massed formations will be fatal, although at certain ikey positions strong concentrations will be necessary. The element of time is on the side of Ethiopia. If the Italian machine can be Jdown by the recognized technique Jof guerrilla warfare, then the lengthening of the campaign may. [bring the unhealthy summer to the rescue of the defenders. It is far too early to judge whether the margin fof Italian superiority in material and staff work is great enough to eliminate even that advantage from Ethiopia's possession. Eye-witness accounts of the fighting are not at present available. The war correspondents, once again, being has carefully shepherded in places convenient to either side. Assessment lof the fighting capacity of either side can only be achieved by processes of deduction when established facts are disclosed. That cannot an immediate event. That the laponing stages have been in favour Jof the Italians seems plain. If it had been otherwise, then there would be something seriously wrong with the invaders General Staff. It has had many months of preparation. It has been able, Jwithout any hindrance and in elaborately guarded privacy, to Jorganize its striking forces and to Jensure their support by a perfectly equipped system of communications. JAlthough the general idea of the advance must have been obvious, its actual expression could retain sufficient of the element of surprise {to ensure success. And success, 50 far as can be judged from the) despatches hitherto received, has been commanded.
The opinion has been formed that, the Italian intention is to establish. protectorate in Abyssinia. On this it is assumed that the attack: from the East and the South is conceived. The cables indicate at "Toast three defined points from which simultaneous advances are iboing carried out. From Italian Somaliland General Graziana is re~ ported to be launching an invasion fon a wide front. His troops have at once captured Dole which is near the point of contact of Abyssinia, Kenya and Italian Somaliland and must be an important point in protection of the invaders' left flank.
General Graziana's objective is supposed to be Harar, but he hi yet to show how he' proposes approach it. Early cables have spoken of an Italian concentration round Int, Musso Ah in the triangle made by the boundaries of Eritrea, French Somaliland and the Abyssinian province of Danakil. At Assab the Italians have created a specially formidable base and it is possible that plans are there being devised for some spectacular air operation. At all events the Ethiopians are reported to be giving special attention there to the avoidance of day movements, A fragmentary report announces the contact of Italian with Abyssinian troops at Gendar, near the Sudan frontier. If this is true the probability is that while the frontal attack on Adowa has been pressed to success, the invaders have staged another advance up the valley of the Takkaze. Although for obvious reasons, it is impossible to arri at any' very definite appreciation of the significance of the campaign developed to date, it seems reasonable to suggest that the general idea enshrined in the reported Italian movements is consistent with the objective of a convergence on Addis Ababa, The preliminary air-bombing of Sakata which is in the direct line from Adowa to Addis Ababa may be factor in the advance with that end in view.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.