The Archive · 1923

CHANG TSO-LIN NOT TOO 6ECURE

It is impossible to persuade the Chinese in Peking that Chang Tso-lin is not preparing to invade Chihli almost any time and equally impossible to persuade the foreigners who live in the shadow of his magnificence in Mukden that he cannot or dares not invade Chihli because he is no longer sufficiently strong in Manchuria to risk moving an effective force out of the "Three Eastern Provinces. The more sagacious Chinese observers in Shanghai are fully convinced; however, that Chang Tso-in does not intend to leave Manchuria while the Chibli organization is intact because he is too well aware of the elaborate machinations against him in his own domain which the Chihli party would foster in the event of another war. All the old Hunghutze chiefs whom Chang Tso-lin weeded out of his military organization after the last defeat and who still have a_ certain amount of influence in the army and much more influence in more dangerous circles, are already the allies of the Chihli party and are pledged to revolt against. Chang Tso-lin whenever he turns his back to them.

Worst of all, a great proportion of the young returned student off-cers inthe re-organized Fengtien army regard themselves as pupils of Tuan Chi-jui and are banded together under the guidance of his agents with the idea of putting Chang Tso-lin quietly aside when opportunity offere and of: declaring themselves for Tuan -Chi-jui. Chang Tso-lin of course knows of all this and is therefore very unlikely to run off on any wild goose chases into Chihli. As his position at home becomes less and less* secure he is much more likely, indeed, to. come to an agreement with Tsao Kun so that his position in Manchuria may be confirmed by Peking and so that he may be that much freer to deal with sedition at home.

TOO MUCH ADVERTISING, Bearing all_ these things in mind, the anti-Chihli politicians here have agreed that the likeliest way of hastening Tsao Kun's political demise is to withdraw all apparent opposition, let him and his Tientsin followers believe that they are secure from outside moles. tation and then foment inter-clique jealousies within the Chibli party in the hope of promoting inter-clique feuds. This is a course which, if cleverly pursued, could not have failed of success, if men like Marshal Tuan had not given it too mrch advertising. There has been so much talk throughout the country, however, of the impending break up of Tsao's big loosely knit following that the Chihli leaders have come to recognize internal dissension og more serious menace than an armed coalition.

Agents of oath and every group within the party are therefore running about now from camp to camp exhorting all the big chiefs to face this menace and to refrain from creating friction. They are promising that objectionable persons like Wu Ching-lien will be eliminated, that the Tientsin clique will be disciplined and that the yoke" of the faithful will be easy and their burden light. They argue that if the Chihli party shows a solid front, even passive resistance will in time be discouraged and that a conciliatory policy will bring many present enemies into the fold.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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