Navy Department's Fears as to National Defence Under. the Reed-Matsudaira Agreement Frost Our Owy Tokyo, Apr, 2.
The acceptance by Japan of the Reed-Matsudaira naval compromise, albeit with certain reservations, undoubtedly will have proved to be one of the main factors tending to lift tthe "defeatist" atmosphere in which the London naval conference was wrapped for the past three weeks.
There was, however, the grave possibility of the success of the negotiations being seriously impaired owing to Mr, MacDonald and Mr. Stimson transmitting representations direct to the Japanese Government, instead of through Mr. Wakatuski, head of the Japanese delegation at London, who was fully empowered to disetes these questions, The Japanese press report that the etepresentations transmitted direct to Tokyo over the heads of the Japanese delegation had a virtual threat to the effect that, if Japan rejected the Reed-Matsudaira compromise, the conference would be wrecked and she Would be held responsible for this. Happily, the Japanese public learnt of this only at the eleventh hour, and even so there were ugly portents of possible repercussions on publ opinion here that a threat was al-agedly contained in the representations of Mr, MacDonald and Mr. Stimson to "force Japan's hands." Better yet, the Japanese Government had already made up its mind as regards its policy, which was to accept. the compromise in all. its essentials, despite some. reservations, before the Stimson-MacDonald communication had been received.
If the news of the alleged "threat" had become public earlier, there would have been much mischief done nationalism here—and Japanese nationalism is very. touchy—would have flared up at the alleged slur ce": There wore, none the less, japan and the insult to her de-
outspoken editorials voicing indignation at "coercive the methods' employed.
The conditional acceptance of the Reed-Matsudaira compromise was decided on at a meeting of the Cabinet Council yesterday at which Admiral Yamanashi, VicouAdmiral of the Navy, was present. Speaking behalf of the Navy Department, Admiral Yamanashi expressed strong disapproval of the Government's policy on the ground that it endangered the national defence and Aeclared that, under the circumstances, the Navy Department, however, being a Government depart-sent, had no alternative but to fall in line with the Government's policy. Political observers here prediet that, while the conditional acceptance by the Hamaguchi Cal of the Reed-Matsudaira compromise will undoubtedly clarify the atmos: phere of the naval conference, it is very likely to arouse considerable opposition in Japan, strong enough to wreck the Government.
No untoward developments are expected just now, but, when the special session of the Diet meets, probably next month, the Opposition is liable to work up the feelings of the people to a dangerous extent, especially as there is genuine dissatisfaction among. the naval authorities, This is expected to lead to movements by various public bodies condemning the tentative treaty and may seriously affect its ratification by the Privy Council. The Navy authorities have been outspoken against. the Government's naval policy, while Admiral Togo, venerated and esteemed by countrymen as the saviour of Japan at the time of the Russo-Japanese swat, has also publicly expressed concern: over the weakening of the fhational defence. The War Office authorities are rendering' direct and Indirect, support to the Navy and, all in all, the prospects before the Government and the outlook for the treaty that may eventuate in London cannot be, as matters are at present, regarded as bright.
The attitude of the Navy towan's this compromise plan is very im-For some time, ever since the contents of the Reed-Matsud ira compromise became known, the Navy Department and the Foreign Office have been at loggerheads.
'Now that the Foreiga Office has won out, the Navy Department contends that it will have to alter completely the naval programme it has been suing since the Washington na' val conference as, they say, the Forei ign Office plan involves a change in the fundamental national defence plans; and it is regarded as very doubtful whether the approval of the Admirals of the Fleet and of the War Council can be secured for any treaty concluded on the basis of the Reed-Matsudaira compromise pla'
An interesting side conflict of views between the Navy, Department and the Foreign Office was forthcoming when Baron Shi hara, the Foreign Minister, and Admiral Kato, Chief of the Na val General Staff, met at a dinner given by the British Embassy last week as a farewell to Prince Takamatsu, third brother of the Emperor, who will shortly leave on a trip to rope.
The Japanese press reports that the two had a heated discuss ion on the na disarmament problem, the chief grievance of the chief the Naval General Staff being the when Mr. Matsudaira reached agreement of views with Senator Reed, he was ting under informal instructions issued to him by the Foreign Office and that the naval authorities had not been consulted th the matter.
The main reasons that prompt ted the Government to necept the Reed-'Matsudaira compromise plan w of an economic nature, as was plained by the mance Minister, Mr. Tnouyé, at yesterday's speci I cabinet: meeting. If the London conferet failed, he pointed out, the Japanese Government would have to appropriate an enormous sum of mot ney for the construction of new ships to replace the obsolete ones. and this would, in turn, face the Governm with great financial dificuities. The success of the London conference, on the other hand, Mr. Inouye said, would give the Government a surplus fund of about Yen 600,000,000 (Gold. $300,000,000).
Tt was these hard financial facts that determined the Government to risk offending the Navy and accept the compromise plan.
The substance of the instruct ions cabled to Mr, Wakatsuki the Government after, yesterday's cabinet meeting was as. follows:
1. The treaty is to be in the nature off a provisional agreem: ent and will be valid only until the end of 1936, It will then be void and this point to be specially stressed in the treaty.
With regard to" an: lary tonnage craft after 1936, Japan wants it clearly understood that she does not abandon the three poi nts, fon which she has been insisting the present conference: namely 70 per cent, ratio vis. on all auxiliary craft, the 70 cent, ratio for heavy cruisers (000-ton boats) mounting eight-i guns, and a submarine strength at the per 10,- inch, of 78,000 ton: Nothing is to restrict Japan making these three claims at any subsequent conference and Japan insists that these three points must then be recognized.
3. As the result of the -acceptance by Japan of the compromise she.will be prevented from building any submarines until 1936, which will seriously hamper the technique of, construction in her naval yards. "Japan, therefore, quests that the age limit of sub-matines, now fixed at 13 years, shortened so as to permit her build some submarines during the period between 1930 and 1936 for purposes of replacement.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.