The "Kokumin" editorially explains why Japan had to give way. Neither America nor Great Britain, it says, has been able to refute the justice' of the three main claims advanced by Japan, but, as the political conditions in America and Great Britaig do not allow of their acceptance in toto, Mr. Stimson refused to entertain them, on the ground that the Senate would not ratify the ensuing treaty, while Br. MacDonald's point was that, Japan was given 70 per cent. of the Lig cruiser strength of America, this would bring Japan's strength too close to the British ratio and cause serious misgivings in the Dominions, particularly Australia, and in Great Bri The paper then asks why tke Japanese delegates did not adhere to Japan's original claims—which they knew to be just—even at the cost of the break-up of the conference, and thinks that the reason for this was threefold:—(1) Japan's unyielding insistence threat ened to render an greement among America, Great Britain, and Japan impossible; (2) it tended to pre-Judice the negotiations between Great Britain, France, and Italy; and (8) because such threatened to result in the estrangeent of British and American feeligs towards Japan, which would produce serious effects on Japan's international position, politically as, well as economically.
Tt is also quite possible, the paper continues, that the Japanese di tes carefully considered the posible effect of a failure of the present conference on the financial interests of Japan. "It is obvious, begin from next y of the failure of the present conference, Japan will have to find 150,000,000 x year for rarposes, but it is well-nigh imy sible to find this money unless recourse is had to further taxation. The increase of taxes in the present state of business depression will surely vitiate popular ideas, and, when these facts are taken into consideration, it is easy to under-slond the attitude taken by the Japanese delegates in recommending that the compromise plan be accepted by the Government.
The "Asahi", while thinking that the Government followed the best course in agreeing to the com hopes that, in the reservations it proposes to make, the Government will reserve the right to build a certain amount of tonnage as against the three 10,000-ton cruisers to be built by America after 1036, or make it clear that the agreement to be reached at the present Naval Conference should become null and void on the expiry of the term of the treaty, so that Japan may be able to attend to her building plan after that date, in accordance with America's building plans.
This paper, too, thinks that Japan's insistence on a cruiser or two would tend to prejudice her international position and would. actually have the effect of increasing the insecurity of the country, "for the actual strength of a country be judged by her tonnage The paper concludes by declaring that, since the Japanese Government has seen to it that the Jupanese delegates reserve the right io revert to Japan's original claim at. the next conference. the concession Japan has made will be one in form only and not in fact, and that, taken all in all, if Japan has not scored a positive success, it can be safely said that she has not failed either.
The Naval General Staff is reported to be seeking the convocation of a Supreme Military Council, in the presence of the Emperor, with the object of blocking the ratification of any treaty incorporating the Reed-Matsudaira compromise. This! group is led by Admiral Kanji Kato, Chief of the Naval General Staff, who insists that acceptance of the' compromise would gravely imperil Japan's defences. Admiral Kanji Kato is not a politician and no. political motives actuated the virtual rebellion he is organizing against the Cabinet. He is responsible for the country's sea defences and is firmly of the opinion that these ate gravely imperilled—to use his own words—by the _Reed-Matsudaira compromise, Tt is interesting, in this connection, to recall that.
Admiral Kanji Kato was the stoutest opponent at Washington, in 122, of the 60 per cent. ratio. Then, pied dissatisfaction of Admiral Takarabé, the Navy Minister, who is attending the London Conference. At London, it is stated, there was a wide divergency of views between Admiral Takarahé and his assistants and Mr. Wakatsuki and his—in_ other words between the naval element "tthe diplomatic element, Admiral Tokarabé is said to have cabled to Wong Says:
"All rua at night lead to the ral White Way too, the naval clement of Japan's disarmament delegation fought tooth and nai for a 70 per cent. ratio for this country vis-a-vis the ited States, maintaining that it was possible to provide for the country's security and defence with less. The American delegation refused to entertain the request and, when the Premier, advising him not to accept the compromise plan, and maintaining that there was' room fo: further negotiation on both the Averiean and. the Japanese side.
jr. Wakatsuki and) Mr, Mat= sudaira, however, it is. said, strongly cautioned the Tokyo authorities against rejection of the Reed-Matsudaira scheme, which, they suid, was the limit to which the United States was prepared to 0 and the rejection of which would mean that the United States dele gation would take up a stronger Altitude, 'The Government decided against' Admiral Takarabé and the Navy Minister, it is said, made pre~ parations to return to Japan at once, but was ordered by Tokyo to remain in London until the conference actually terminates. Tt is expected that, if he does not cable his resignation, Admiral reaches Tokyo, seemed as though the Washington Conference would fail, Adm jhe be relieved of his post. This, it al is said, will place the Cabinet in a Tomasaburo Kato, senior of Admi very unenviable position.
Kanji Kato (who was then a v Ninia) verrel arguments cla ce cee Sontended. tha
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.