Der New Monin Saree oF Conn 'a' Personal Tntrpeetaion ey WY. is. Kely & Walsh, Shanenal Mr. Lin has given us an excellent study om "China under Deprecated Sliver, "agas-isai" which contains corial: original research of consider: Sie Importance. ils new book is much nearer 10 actually while, on {he other hand, for that very reason igo no cniin ecg rear, but a personal interpretation seneraliy well known, 'But these facts ud' their siallsteal expression have
teligenty than anywhere else, Their combined ore, fly and tne Interpretation, on the other and, arly suffers from the hurry which ras imposed on the author, who had lovfinish at a given date.
'The book in divided into three main perla, a history et Ching's currency From 1002 it the November reforms, 2 description of the November reform oth intact' and. according tthe vowed Intention of the official re: formers, "and a pedagogical and Seely orthodox exposition of "the problems of monetary coutel"
The historia! part, im its argument, not very closely Kt together, for, the Brat ofall the monetary cries He. Lin has realized very dosly that China's crisis was the result not 20 tuck of vallver"appresiaion and American silver policy, but of the impact of world depression, On the ther hand the convention which hae Sirecdy grown up as to the causes of China's toutes, ha ancial history as. conventionally agreed upon, according to this unconventional line of reasoning. The careful reader, therefore, keeping this dlagnostle' distinction' in mind, will be aware of dissonances in the line of reasoning.
New Currency Policy Such a- dissonance between convention and fact also impairs Mr. Lin's exposition of "the breakdown of the silver standard." The official convention in that regard 1s that by fan Ingenious change of policy in November 1935, China was freed from her "silver chains." Mr. Lin, with most careful observers, agrees that these "silver chains" actually had been broken before, namely by. the "gentlemen's agreement" of Spring 1935, not to export silver and by the actual suspension of note redemption, the summer of 1935. What Teally happened in. November, was that finally realizing the fait accompli, the Minister of Finance, after an orgy of well-informed speculation, accept ed the facts and began to act, accord. ing to them. It may be interred that the official position of the author prevented him from. turning the oodlights fully on these facts which, though' shortly indicated, are not alvan the accent they deserve.
The achievements of the new currency policy are described clearly and very well indeed, although certain complicating features have been ushed into the background, like the establishment of a new bank of issue in North China, the place occupied by the Farmers Bank' of Ching, the increasing Issue of subsidiary notes by quite a few provincial bonks, ete.
The Banks and The specific aims and means of monetary control are indicated very well, indeed, But the difficulties in the way of coming up to the slanderd set by Mr. Lin, which are inherent factors of the scelal, political, and economic structure of China do not seem to be sufficiently emphasized. The analysis of fiscal policies might have been carried further, and the aieulties resulting from the peculiar structure of China's foreign and domestle commerce, which stands in the way of modern banking developments, also might have been emphasized; for with foreign trade pre-veilingly under the control of foreign firms with foreign banking connec tions, and domestic trade carried on generally with old-style methods, it diMeult to imagine, how a system of banking control based on the discount of bills of exchange could be established. "Proper and useful as the orthodox line of argument is In that respect, it requires adaptation 10 special Chinese conditions which cannot be ignored.
On the other hand, Mr. Lin's book stuffed with stalistieal material which is not easily assembled, including such materials as are generally accessible in the Chinese language only, and gives a very clear analysis of the tendencies and forces which dominated in China's financial history during the last three years. Especially his exposition of the part played by the Shanghai banks is very lucid and interesting. Me describes how Sharghai beginning from 1929, Lo, the tart of the world depression, sucked in the country's liquid resources, how the banks were unable to find' suit able and liquid oullels for the inflowing funds and had to have recourse to financially unsound invest fluent practices, and how finally finanial machinery became clogged, when the depression proceeding from the interior definitely hit the coast, not only in the form of w concentration of liquid funds at Shanghai, but now also in that of insolvencies and the whole chain of events resulting therefrom, While Mr. Lin's description of the events puts perhaps too much Blame on the bankers, he gives in the whole a very clear statement of he situation and its results, Mr. Lin's book is certainly up tilt now by far the best appreciation the fads and the problems of Chin ccurreney reform, and deserves careful reading—xa,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.