dan.
Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan is reported to have entered Lunghua Arsenal yesterday and to have announced that he is in control of the district, His undertaking was less easily achieved than he may have expected ut first, because he pre-ferrell to fight rather than bargain, and s did the other side. Hence the very anxious events of the last three days, the sti!] badly disorganized state of the surrounding country and the presence inside Settlement limits of several thousand—troops, whose—ultimate destination affords no easy or ble problem. Presently be-Heved that Marshal Chi will try to regain Nanking and as he is understood to control all the chief towns along the railway except Soochow, which is doubtful, and has a loyal henchman in the north in the person General Bei Bao-san, hiv prospects are not without hope.
No little criticism hax been heard because the preliminaries to the recent fighting must have been arranged from within the Settment, Marshal Chi having been living in Love Lane since he was driven from Shanghai. The Council is blamed for not expelling him and (to come to smaller things) this paper is blamed for expressing the opinion that it would be best the long run that Marshal Chi should win, as being inconsistent with the sound principle that militarists and politicians should Hot be allowed to use Shanghai asylum from which to engineer plots, From that ciple we assuredly de not depart. But there are times and cireamstances in which facts are too strong to be ignored. It may be said that Marshal Chi was not really. using Shanghai as an asylum. He came to Love Lai because he had " house the But he would have been in no danger in living in Chapei, which was full of his own troops, whom he simply had to summon Saturday night, to make them follow him immediately, In the second place, while it may be said that Shanghai is not concerned with the minutia of Chinese politics, there appears no doubt whatever that if Chi had not taken action against Chang Yuan-ming, Sun Chuanfang of Hangchow-would have done so. So that there would have been fighting in any exse and there can be no question which of the three the Chine: Prefer to have as victor in the neighbourhood of Shanghai. It is also not to be forgotten, that General Chen Yue-san's defeated troops wer camped in the there were double claimants for' every official post round about and no one in any real authority. The position was rapidly—becoming intolerable. Finally and most important point of all: if Marshal Chi had been expelled from Love Lane, he would merely have moved into the French Co1 cession or Chapei. The Council would have made an enemy of, him and would have gained nothing. It is a sound French Proverb which says, "Faut pas] oracher en Vair pour que ¢a vous retombe sur lo bec".
To return to the question of principle, there can be no disputing the fact that foreign concessions and settlements ought not to be used by Chinese conspirators for the furtherance of their intrigues. Unfortunately it has also to be admitted tha until the Powers agree to act—and really to act—on a common plan in this respect, no relief to be expected. We can look for no help from the Diplomatic Body, many of whom have never been in Shanghai and regard it! merely as a source of anreasonable annoyance to their peace. There are not a few matters which, when the present distur-banees in China resolve themselves into settled government, urgently need attention for the good both of Chinese and foreigners, among them this right of asylum. But unless Shangh ise some means of bringsities directly to the notice of Governments at home, it will continue to have to settle each ease on its merits for itself, as best it may.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.