July 24.
The news that Mr, Wang Ching-wei_ is on his way tu Peking throws an interesting light on the enlarged conference of the Kuomintang which was opened on July 15, The fir: unavoidable conclusion is that the leader of the Left is willing to as in the formation of a government in Peking, and the other is that the military fortunes of the North are ap. parently in a satisfactory enough state 16 justify his leaving the safe retreat of Hongkong, It. will be remembered that, at the outbreak of this present war, Mr. Wang Ching-wei was invited to proceed to Peking to discuss the formation of a government in the North, but delayed his response on various pretexts, the chief of which was that the time was not yet ripe, It is probably not correct to state that it was simply the military position then or now which was the predominating factor in the attitude adopted by Mr, Wang at either period, for it is conceivable that the negotiations to draw the various Parties together must, of neces sity, have taken considerable time, Nevertheless, the fact that he has decided that he can be of use to his party in the North this juncture throws an ting light on the military situation, particularly in view of Position as indicated in the communiqu Tt may not mean that the Nationalist Government is considered to be in danger of defeat, thought it does seem to indicate that Mr, Wang Chin wei is confident that the Northern Coalition is in no danger of annihilation. Obviously he would not run the risk of attempting to set up a government which did not have some element of permanency about it.
A more cresting political point is the position of the Northern generals in this present development. Whatever political ideas he had when he embarked on this present rebellion, neither Gen, Feng Vu-hsiang nor Gen. Yen Hsi-shan had more in his mind than the imposing of his will on Nanking, or, in default of that, the establishment of his own regime in his own territory. The two warlords were persuade ed to adopt a line of action which gave the feudal, military revolt against the pseudo-constitutionalism of the South a political complexion which it i+ probable they never contemplated at the outset. Their invitation to the Leftists to assist in the formation of the new government in Peking was, therefore, an opportune development calculate ed to obtain a moral support which neither Yen nor Feng was individually able ta secure, They may, by so doing, have cut their own throats, The success of the Left Wing in holding the two commanders together, despite What are reported to be bitter divisions over the question, of money, is not so imposing as it would at first appear. Neither of these two leaders can afford to quarrel with the other. Divided, the Nationalist Government could pick off each at will unjigd they may be able to main-heir position against Nanking, while the politicians establish a constitutional government along their own lines, But, that constitutional government is the very danger which may destroy the coalition leaders.
Once established, the struggle between. Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Vu-hsiang on the one side and to the new government on the other must inevitably break out on the question of money. The same Position will be created as existed between these two and the Nanking Government prior: to the present hostilities, for! both of these men are incapable of looking upon a government as anything but a means of supplying money to militarists. It is not to be believed that Peking will be any more generous in this respect than Nanking has been, and, in order to safeguard its own position, the-familiar game of Playing one off against the other will be adopted in which the whole precarious edifice which is being built in the North will be in grave danger of collapsing, It is this lack of anything permanent emerging from the present situation, or from any of the developments which it is possible to foresee, which makes the whole affair so deplorable. The amount of of money which is being spent on these bootless wars must be immense. It was reported in a southern paper that the cost to Kuangtung of the campaign against the KuangsiJronsides combination amounted to $4,000, 000 a month—90 per cent. of the income of the province, What the war in the north is costing it is impossible to estimate. Whatever is its result—short of an out and out victory for Nanking and the total elimination of the rebels—a erate of affairs will be perpetuated which cannot fail to produce wars and still more wars, and it is no idle contention to urge that a win for the North or a stalemate such as exists at present would be the worst possible thing for China, Expensive as these seasonal campaigns have been, mortally, industrially and economically, real statesmanship at the present juncture could do much to restore the damaged fortunes of this country: and rehabilitate it in the eyes of a world which is becoming more than tired of the ineptitude shown by its leaders the last. few years. The solution seems to be the abandonment of the principle of political tutelage by a section of the Kuomintang and the establishment of a system of government in which all sides should be heard, To argue that such is impossible is to admit tha China has not yet advanced as far along the constitutional road as certain apologists make such frantic endeavours to hav: the world believe.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.