Sept. 24.
Mr, Suesama Okamoto has taken pains Jelaborately to prove what few people endeavour to deny: that the Chinese Government, faced in the North by unwary ranted aggression from Japan, decided that the politico-military needs of' the situation demanded the combination of resistance in the North with a strong attack on Japanese {orees in the Shanghai area. Mr, Okamoto's statement may also be cordially endorsed in} Its contention that he, as representing the 'Japanese Government here, did his best in the few weeks leading up' to the outbreak to keep Shanghai clear of hostilities. He was supported by a marked mitigation in the fasperity of the Japanese Landing Party's occasions. He was assisted by ce-operation from the City Government of Shanghai so far as that administration could contro! local events, "Unfortunately, in endeavouring to throw on Chinese shoulders all the blame for the gradual increase in local tension and for breaches of the Peace Agreement of 1932, he entirely overlooks the progressive measures which the Japanese Naval garrison took from 1932 onwards to usurp the authority of the [Shanghai Municipal Council in the Settlement, to faunt the preparedness of the armed might of that garrison, to convert Hongkew! Jand Yangtszepoo into what became increasingly 9 Japanese enclave and therefore a clear menace to the security for which the Peace Preservation Corps, with Japanese approval, was originally intended to provide, No-one' "who recalls the various local "incidents"—some of them more accurately described as "mare's nests"—which incessant ly demanded the alertness of high officials of the Municipal Council to an extent altogether beyond their intrinsic significance can be! blind to an aspect of the situation which, not unnaturally, cannot be taken into account by Mr. Okamoto but which is vital to a fair appreciation of the issues involved. The nice adjustment of responsibility for breaches of the Peace Agreement cannot be satisfactorily achieved without consideration of _those points and particularly of the Chinese argument that the proceedings of the Joint Commission on which Mr. Okamoto so firmly relies were, by circumstances not entirely within Japanese control, transformed into machinery less for supervising the observance fof the agreement by both sides than for registering Japanese protests.
Mr. Okamoto graphically reveals the] extent to which he went in' relying on the efficacy of his ce-operation for preserving the peace of Shanghai. His bona fides in that Matter cannot be disputed. He took risks Which might have seriously prejudiced his own position with his Government and evidently the rapid concentration of the [Chinese forces in vastly superior numbers severely tested the comparatively small garrison at the disposal of the Japanese [Naval Commander. No doubt the reinforcement and military armament of the Chinese Preservation Corps could be regarded as fa technical breach of the Peace Agreement, [but in the light of the constant pressure exerted by Japanese militarism on the Government at Nanking and the reflection of that pressure by Japanese activities in the [Settlement, it is not unreasonable to argue that the conditions in which the Peace JAgreement was. signed had been radically changed. China, in fact, whether in Shang-hal, East Hopel or Peiping, had been put in the' position of the little animal who, liable attack, was so naughty as to prepare to defend itself. Mr. Okamoto's personal con-[science is justifiably so clear in this matter that he may be forgiven his apparent lack of perception that the course wf events in China Since September 1931 should impel a Japan jose spokesman to tread more delicately even than Agag in dilating on the subject of breaches of agreement. So allegations that the Chinese authorities have been concerned to strengthen their defences are apt to leave the critic cold, as he ponders over the extra~ vacant claims' of Japan's military and naval representatives here and in the North to order the goings of the people of this country and develop an ever-increasing control over Chinese territory, Such encroachment which, despite the welcome but abortive evolution of the "new concept" of China in Tokyo, ever paused in Its stride, could not but drive its victim to the' desperation of resistance. That. fundamental fact is not Gisposed of in Mr. Oxamoto's study of the local situation here.
With Mr, Okamoto's suggestion that the Powers were remiss in failing to summon a. round table conference to discuss the future Status of Shanghai there. may be some measure of agreement, but it must be conessed that, apart from their world-preoccupations, the Powers could not have felt hat opportunity for such a discussion was facilitated by the aggressive trend of Japan's policy. Just as they were opposed to con= sideration of the scheme for a demilitarized zone because it definitely took shape under the shadow of the attack on Shanghat in 1032, so they could.not expect practical results from discussions which Were bound to raise the whole question of Japanese intentions as betokened by the uninterrupted march. of Jevents in the North.- Perhaps it would have been "better for Shanghai had they. faced those dimeulties, but he would be a bold man who would aver that such action would have borne fruit, especially in view of the chequered story of the International Settlement's own efforts to secure Japanese ce-operation in solving problems wf the outside roads and the inspection of factories. Mr, Okamoto plain= tively describes his own country 9s a bad propagandist, No-one will quarrel with the description, for nothing could be more damag~ ing to the ease which he painstakingly secks {to establish than Japan's own actions in China during the last six years. Nor does he do himself justice when he ventures to go beyond Shanghai and launch an attack on the personnel of the Government at Nanking. Even it' it be conceded that. his picturesque charges are justied—a view which this Journal must' not be taken to endorse it"'may" pertinently be asked whether fon that account a friendly, neighbour estrous of cultivating the "closest re~ lations with the Chinese people" is entitled to descend in overwhelming. force on that people's shores and spread death and destruetion In assertion of the altruistic desire to change its leaders, Logic moreover is not Mr. Okamoto's strong point, for he attributes the main responsibility for the sing of the Chinese Government to the lack of "political oF national consciousness among the Chinese masses." So it is not surprising that the armed forees now operating in China at Japan's bidding are not able notably to dise tinguish between those whom Mr. Okamoto describes as enemies and those whom he clasps to his bosom as friends, It is unnecessary Perhaps to recall that the attempt by Tokyo—repeated by Mr, Okamoto—to draw a parallel between the present situation and that of 1927 when the British Defence Force came Shanghai has been devastatingly exposed London. Mr, Okamoto's catholic taste in perusing the foreign press has apparently not Jed him to that discovery. The concluding passages of his statement show an aban-Sonment of the earlier effort to be objective. Breathless incoherence marks its criticisms of world opinion as of the Chinese Government. That sure sign of a bad case evokes sympathy for a diplomat gallantly struggling with adversity. "It docs not detract from the accuracy of his assessment of the propaganda to which it thus makes contribution,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.