2 Aprit 3.
'While it is quite possible that the recent defeats of the insurgents in 'Spain may have been somewhat exaggerated, it is clear from' the communiques of both sides that such, reverses did occur and were of proportions which will not per mit of their being ignored. When to that is added the reports of the insurrections within the ranks of the rebels, it becomes apparent that the symptoms of impending defeat have demonstrated their existence: That impression is reinforced by the accounts which have-leaked out of extreme differences of opinion between the Spanish leaders and those in command of the German and Italian volunteers, who, it is now alleged, are seeking to obtain control of General Franco's venture.
Thus, with discontented Spanish rebels on the one hand, and on the other division between the Spaniards and their foreign helpers, all" of which is indicative of a prevalent feeling of defeat, factors exist which JMnay sooner or later—sooner, unless one party or the other can assert complete authority over the whole of the insurgents—cause the rebel campaign to collapse. That, of course,' presupposes that the countries at present actively concerned in the rebellion or its subjugation will continue to withald any further assistance in accord with their present commitments. An entirely different "position may arise if present agreements are disregarded in the light of possible future events, but at the moment the realistic view assumes that. the various countries involved will abide by their pledges. It is true that international pacts have in recent years assumed an ephemeral quality which gives cause for great anxiety, but if in this instance they are again to be lightly set aside, the consequences may be exceedingly grave for Europe.
It has often been emphasized in this column that the rebellion in.
Spain has long ceased to be a purely domestic affair, and has now as~ sumed the complexion of a war between two ideologies In which there can be no compromise which will Jast, and which can only end in the complete defeat of one side or the other, with, perhaps, disastrous results to the losers." Italy, Germany and the Roman Catholic Church naturally desire that the rebels shall cast down the existing government, the two first because: they want to see the establishment in, Spain. of a'government similar to their own, and under their friendly guidance; the latter because the suppression of the anti-clerical government. might lead to a restoration of the church's position in Spain, " Rusila's anxiety that the Spanish govern: ment should prevail arises from a fear that its failure would amount to severe moral reverse—the same may be said of both Italy and Germany—though in effect it would be rather a defeat of the much con-, demned Trotskyism, than' of Stalin's modified policy with regard to the spreading of the world revolution {in other countries, which constitutes one of the chief differences between him and 'Trotsky.. The interests of Great -Britaln and France inthe matter arises from a fear of the consequences, if either a Fascist or Leftist victory, establishes factors in the" Mediterranean. which might ultimately, constitute' a serious threat to. their communications France: would not. greatly ike "to ['sce-a double Fascist threat to her communications" with Morocco, While a further control of the Mediterranean routes. might prove Britain, of some embarrassment to Great
Such a state of affairs indicates that the threat of defeat to, one side or the' other creates conditions far more serious than the,, mere existence of a civil war in. Spain, and as one or the other proceeds towards victory the situation must necessarily become increasingly a gravated.. Great Britain and France will do their utmost to escape being embroiled in the bitter dispute which may arise, but it is clear that their interests "may become 30 seriously 'Involved that it will be only by the exercise of the greatest control. that they will be able. to keep out of trouble and prevent a Keneral European' conflagral Fortunately it is by "no means certain that those nations more closely concerned. in the outcome of the Spanish struggle are any more anxious than Britain and France to embark upon a series of actions Which might -bring- about a European catastrophe, though it is quite -clear: that: the Italy might feel her military honour somewhat, involved if recent reverses of the insurgents lead to their final defeat, the other hand there are indic the growing impression that Signor 'Mussolini and his advisers are not' altogether happy over the prospects before them. For these reasons it justifiably hoped that in the dif cult times which will have to be faced during the next few months great restraint will be exercised on both sides, for it is not merely the question of what type of government Spain should ultimately have, but whether the peace of the world, and a very attenuated peace at that, shall not again, and this time irretrievably, be ruined.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.