The Archive · 1931

A Different Light

June 2

The Feetham Report has been considered generally, speci-tically, in regard to its formulation of the idea of an inter national partnership and obli-quoly, in the light of its bearing on the extra-territoriality issue. Its importance makes apology for extended examination of its proposals unnecessary. There remains the vital question of the effect which it may have on the hitherto accepted policy of the National Government of China towards the so-called Inter national Settlement—the modifying epithet, frequently on the lips of Chinese politicians, is justified by Mr. Justice Feetham's own exposition of the changes, brought about by the association of Chinese in the direction of the Council's policy. and likely to be intensified as time goes on. The question will at once be asked: what reason can be adduced from the Report for a belief that the. Chinese attitude towards Shanghai? The admitted, however, that the Report points out that that at-Statements which he has per- titude does not give much en-mitted himself to make in public couragement do not argue any very solicitous) regard for some of the evnsiderations expressly noted in the despateh of August 10, 1929, in} the aide-memoirs of December 20 of the same year or in Mr. Justice Feetham's remarks quoted above. It will be presumed that if the negotiations with the Foreign Powers have made the progress hinted at in apparently inspired messages from Nanking, his public statements have not done him justice in that regard. 'There need be no surprise if presumption were correct, for statements made for political purposes come within a category' different from that in which' agreed diplomatic proposals are placed. Recognition must also be given to the fact that the British Government are not disposed, whatever their critics may think, to ignore the important point that pledges dependent on the fulfilment of. certain conditions are not opera-ive without those conditions. The difficulty of making public the course of delicate _negotia-ions will be recognized. No! responsible journal would desire to make more onerous the task "to the idea of securing a revision of the Land Regulations the process of international negotiation and agreement; but the prospects may be completely changed if the whole question can be viewed in a different light! from. that in which, it has eto been regarded."

The suggestion is that recognition of the advantages of, the Settlement regime to China, combined with the development. of a "broad platform of common interest," on which "a united constructive effort" by "accredited representatives of China and the Foreign Powers" can be wed, must facilitate th: vision. This naturally crux of the whole problem, Without. the consent of the National Government and the Foreign Powers, the measures, designed to give Shanghai the full opportunity for self-expression to the advantage of China and the world at large, cannot be carried into effect. There niust be a stalemate, leading certainly to increasing' difficulty of administration and, possibly, what. may. be euphemistically described as friction. The policy far as can be judged from the mouths of their spokesmen, is to, regard the Settlement. as a excrescence which must be removed a3 son a3 release from other pre-occupations permit. "Immediate rendition" is the accepted cry. The impractie ability of its adoption tacitly "recognized but every possible means is taken to enforce the notion that the authority of the Municipal Council exercised on sufferance, Where, by indirect.or direct action, the National Government can assert their sovereign rights, assiduous ingenuity is set to work. Resistance, passive and active, is stimulated to any attempt'on the part of the Council to adjust its authority to th emergence of new adminis. trative needs, requiring as it 80 often does either a new interpretation of the Land Regul: tions or, even, their amendment There is no need to parti cularize: current controversies: in nearly every branch of Muni: cipal administration will provide the text.

Tt may be argued on behalf of the Chinese Government that if they thus can carry the position by flank attacks and piecemeal advances, why should they trouble to change their policy? The Council's sense of the undesirability. of precipitating crises has given rise to a policy of conciliation which puts many trump cards in the hands of the Government. As the principle endorsed by the Government and, of rendition has been firn)

indeed, made ostensibly one of immediate practical adoption, there is, it may be contended, no earthly reason why that Government should consider, proposals which, although making rendition the ultimate goal, delay its operation for a long term, even though the interim may be occupied in. progressive preparation for it. The argument that immediate rendition would throw Shanghai into chaos and promptly eliminate security and progress is not in itself im-gu pressive in the eyes of that Government. First of all they will refuse to admit that such result, will necessarily acorn secondly they may say that, even if it did accrue, they will at least have removed a standing humiliation in the presence of a foreign administration controlling the most important City in China, owing though it does its very ' existence to foreign pioneers and to Sino-foreign cooperation. If this were the whole picture there might be little to say, except to record regret that human prejudice would 0 wantonly endanger that which human' effort had created. It should at once be noted that, although immediate rendition is the cry, its practical acceptance would be extremely distasteful, to uso no stronger word, to the Government; it would be staggeringly alarming fo the vast Chinese interests in Shanghai itself, even though from those very interests may frequently come apparent endorsements of it. This emphasized in the Report's penetrating and sympathetic comment on the difficulty. of reconciling public statements of Chinese leaders with their private professions—a_ difficulty which, by the way, illustrates one of the benefits of the Settle ment regime. Nor will it wise for exponents of present Chinese policy to rely too much on the efficacy of the "nibbling" or "pin-prick" method of attack. The Council has, admittedly, been actuated bya desire to treat the relationship of the Settlement to China as sub judice. This has given the policy of conciliation a temporary as Well as a permanent significance. The judge having given his opinion, there may be certain issues on which the Council will feel that it can refuse any longer to be manoeuvres out of position. "This must, small measure, detract' from the advantages of the piecemeal process. Moreover, in the light of the emphatic exposition of, the essential soundness of a Settlement regime and its vital

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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