The Archive · 1928

NANKING'S FOREIGN POLICY

Feb.

The end of the Russian swa: the Kuomintang naturally leaves that Party with the difficult task of determining a new programme of foreign relations. The 1924 Party Congress definitely determined that the Kuomintang and Soviet Rus: tone group in the country can resist the force of such a sane proposal. But diplomatic unity entails the proposition of the strictest neutrality on the part of the Powers and in the attitude of the various Chinese Governments towards the different Powers. For, how could Peking be unified with Nanking on its Programme towards one Power, when there is the suspicion that. that Power is assisting Nanking or some other of the numerous Chinese regional governmental groups, financially and in other' ways? If there is even the shadow of a doubt in this direction, the whole structure of diplomatic unity must collapse.

It becomes necessary then that in the allocation of cabinet positions in Nanking, the utmost care should be taken that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is 8 person who can meet all the Powers on equal. terms of He should be neither pro-British nor anti-British; he should be neither pro-Japan-nor anti-Japanese; he should relationship. last Ministry of Foreign Affairs was faced with the difficult task of conducting a negative policy. Tt succeeded the bombastic Mr.

Eugene Chen, whose outpourings had incensed most of China's friends and whose activities had brought upon the Chinese people untold misery. Te had inherited the aftermath of Hankow, Kiukiang and the: Nanking Outrage, and dt wat faced by an irritable and di quoted world, Its only contribu should be in alliance; that|ution to China could be the that alliance should result placating of opposition, the in an attack by China on|lessening of bitterness, the all the imperialist Powers, bj which were meant all Power {calming of the storm. It' could -s produce nothing spectacular; it except Soviet Russi and that could not win the approval of immediate programme, the mob. It had to establish rela~ the Kuomintang would contions with states which declined centrate the full force of its to associate with it, because of mass movements against—th je|the unsatisfactory "termination British Empire. This programme: [of the diplomacy concerning the was carried through with un-Nanking Outrage. It was never altering bitterness until the [supported in its policies by its departure of Comrade Borodin own Government, whose officers from China last August, sine {constantly followed internation-when the two or three Kuomin-al tendencies of their own. tang Governments have been vacillating between a contin. nance of the Russian policy and a new international orientation.

The next Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government will be faced by -an even more difficult task, because Uppermost in the minds of some e|the time haa come for the con-of the leaders has naturally been sideration of certain concrete the thought that the enemy problems such as the relation-of Soviet Russia, among th ship of ithe Customs Service Powers, would be willing to to the Nationalist Government, take up the game where th e|which is being considered at!

Russians left off, would be will-this very moment. The appcinting to throw money and arms ment of a Minister whose! and munitions and advisers in-very name indicates that the to the maelstrom of China's Nanking Government is lean-' revolutions and Sok out of it ing towards one particular some

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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