On the other hand, there are about twenty thousand Japanese troops at resent in North China, mostly. cons centrated around Peiping and Tientsin, and along the Peiping-Mukden Railway, in the demilitarized zone. Six thousand of these troops are from the ordinary Japanese North China garrison, they hold Tientsin, the two railway stations In that elly, and the railway bridge from Tientsin towards Peiping. There Is a batta-Yon of Japanese at Fengtai, which has recently been reinforced by troops ent from Manchuria through Shanhaikwan, Other Japanese troops are distributed in the neighbourhood of 'Tientsin and along the Peiping-Mukden Railway. Several thousand have come into Hopel from Jehol, via Kupeikow, but it is expected' that these will be withdrawn to rejoin the Kwantung Army in Manchuria og Soon og reinforcements have arrived from Japan proper. For, in the Japanese view, Manchoukuo is sparsely enough garrisoned without _being drained of troops for a speculative venture in North China.
'To support these troops, at least two divisions of Japanese ore on their way from Japan to Tangku. Two, possibly three, other divisions have been warned for service, and are Being made ready to' join the divisions in North China should the emergency arise.
The peace strength of a Japanese rous division is about ten thousand men; the war-time strength approximately. double. It is therefore probable that the divisions being sent to North China and under provisional orders to go there, number between. seven {eon and eighteen thousand men euch, If nothing occurs to make necessary the despatch of the extra divisions from Japan, it is probable that, before ten days are out, the Japanese will have in North China approximately Atty-Ave thousand men, with the usual army equipment of guns, tanks, lorries, and the necessary adjuncts usually associated with Army troops, Heavy Expenditure a minimum calculation, the maintenance of a force of this size on war basis In North China will cost the Japanese government ¥.35 per month per man, and ubout double that per officer. Estimated at the lower figure, Japan's expeditionary force cannot cost Jess than ¥.1,025,000 a month. 'This estimate. does not take into' account the cost of tra portation, ammunition, billeting, and the re equipment of reservists' who have been called up to put the divisions on to a war basis, Nor does it reckon the cost to the Japanese government of the men who were duc to have been returned to civilian life this month and who have been kept on in the service on account of the northern crisis, As can be seen, the total cost will be enormous, for results which are, to say the least, of 'The same cannot be said of the Chinese. 'The strength of a Chinese division' ig not so easily estimated, owing to the irregular" formations which are still adopted, in spite of the Central Government's best efforts fo put the army on a modern footing. The Chinese can, however, move along Chinese government railways, ud, owing to the recent requisition: ing law, need not cost much to feed, The divisions have not been brought up to a war basis, having been kept at full strength all the time, And the additional expenditure is almost nothing. In this the Chinese have a Ananelai advantage. That Is about all according to competent military observers, since the Japanese are far Deller trained and equipped, better fed, and better led, and in a battle of mah to man should prove easily superior,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.