The first fruits of Mr. Neville Chamberlain's foreign policy is the Anglo-Italian agreement which was signed on Saturday evening. The way has been prepared for a complete change in the relations between the two countries, and it is to be hoped a restoration of the old cordiality which should never have been allowed to disappear, It is not necessary at this juncture to discuss all the many reasons for the deterioration of those relations, save to say that the primary cause was inevitable' combat between the realism of the Italian policy, and the idealism of that followed so persistently by Mr. Anthony Eden. Following the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare, as a result of the rejection of the Hoare-Laval scheme for the settlement of the Abyssinian crisis, Mr. Eden came into power with the backing of that enormously powerful public opinion which had condemned the compromise which Sir Samuel: Hoare and M. Laval had planned. He followed a policy based on the ideology of the League of Nations, and it eventually became apparent that, instead of bettering conditions in Europe, it was speedily worsening them. Unable to t himself to the policy which the Prime Minister wished, Mr. Eden resigned, and Mr. Chamberlain was then free to follow the course which he had laid down for his government of seeking the appeasement of Europe by coming to a better understanding with those nations from which there was a growing estrangement. - This did not mean forsaking the League or its principles, but did involve the recognition of the fact that, by reason of that body's mutilation, it no longer possessed the authority which its founders originally hoped it would have, and which indeed in its earlier years it possessed, though, perhaps, not quite in the form that could be universally acceptable. It should be admitted at once that a policy which sought to impose the ideology of the League upon nations, which would have none of it, was a mistaken one, and, realizing that, Mr. Chamberlain, despite a flood of hostile criticism, sought other avenues towards the establishment of better relations. This journal heartily welcomes the steps which have been taken, as represented in the document which was signed on Saturday, believing that it is only by the adjustment of such questions as the agreement covers that progress can be made towards good understanding, and thereby peace.
The difference between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Eden was, in the last event, one of outlook. Mr. Eden wanted guarantees of Italian good faith before he would negotiate an agreement: Mr. Chamberlain has proceeded upon the assumption of Italian bona fides in the faith that Italian goodwill does exist and will be demonstrated in the manner in which Rome adheres to the undertakings to which it has subscribed. That, and that alone, will be the only means of testing the correctness of Mr. Chamberlain's policy. The proof of this particular pudding will be in the eating thereof, and should it transpire, as it is hoped it will, that the Italian Government as well as the British ce-operate in making this new instrument an effective one, much of the anxiety which at present pervades Europe will have disappeared and confidence reign in its place. This new document opens up vistas which have long been shrouded in gloom. It is reported that Mr. Chamberlain intends offering his services to France for the purpose of bringing about a better understanding; of that country with Italy. There are indications that France will accept, and the cordial endorsement of the Anglo-Italian Agreement by the Paris Press corroborates this journal's view of the probabilities. Taking immediate issues first, it has been wholly lamentable that between the three Allies who made such sacrifices in the common cause some twenty years ago, disputes should have been allowed to arise which put one of them at more than arm's length from the other two. The Italian contribution to the Allies' victory was enormous. There has been in some quarters an unfortunate tendency to belittle Italy's effort during those tragic years, but Ludendorff's summing up of the case in an interview published in 1919 presents a wholly different picture. In that he gave Italy her due in placing among the chief causes of the German defeat "the lack of support from Austria, gripped ever more tightly by the throat by Italy," while Cadorna rightly claims that Italy's "grip on Austria's throat from 1915, compelling her to immobilize against us ever-increasing forces, constituted the most notable result of our war, although it was little apparent to the eyes of civilians. It contributed largely to the victory of Allied arms and to our final triumph."
It is well that these things should be remembered, desirable that as soon as possible there should be a complete restoration of former confidence and friendship, for any policy which tended the other way was as unfortunate in its conception as it proved to be in its results. The effecting of a satisfactory understanding with France is the next step before tackling the imposing problem with the relations of Great Britain and France vis-à-vis of Germany. To that end this newly signed document acquires a rich significance. If it is possible to secure adjustments on so many and important questions between Great Britain and Italy, it should be equally possible to reach a better understanding with Germany. All that is required is a common desire for mutual understanding and a determination to work towards that end. It is true that with regard to Germany other considerations arise, but if Mr. Chamberlain is to succeed with his policy of general appeasement sacrifices will have to be made on both sides, as they have in this instance. It must be clear to everyone that the maintenance of conditions in Europe in which the four great Powers are divided into two more or less hostile camps can only lead to disaster. All of them, no matter what may be the foundations of their governments, have the common desire for peace. The eradication of differences is the best means towards securing it, and the removal of causes for Anglo-Italian friction is the first important step towards the ultimate goal. Sceptics should be warned against adherence to the idea that Italy is dealing with Great Britain with her tongue in her cheek. That will undoubtedly be the opinion held by those of the Eden school of thinking. The wise course is to watch developments as they occur, and it would be the height of imprudence to adopt any other attitude. From a purely British point of view Mr. Chamberlain has embarked upon a bold, realistic policy, which can only be judged by its results, but if those are good, then he will have proved himself to be one of Great Britain's outstanding statesmen, one who will have laid the foundations of a durable peace, importing stability into an edifice which for toa long past has been lamentably tottering. Signor Mussolini's contribution towards this adjustment has also been no mean one, for his initiative made the negotiations possible, while Shanghai will be particularly pleased in the knowledge that, in Count Ciano, a former resident played so; important a role in restoring Anglo-Italian amity.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.