Jagreement at Shanghai might well be studied in conjunction with the difficulties now being lexperierced in composing the affairs "of Europe. On the latter subject a recent speech by Lord Revelstoke, published in the financial columns to-day, throws special illumination, fiom the point of view Looking at the serious prospect
banker and detached political observer Lord Revelstoke urges the importance of the time
men who are now grappling with factor on the attention of states aificutties to which they" have themselves largely added more Jdificulties. by. reason of "the desperate resort to tariff wal Whatever support there may {for the system of discriminating protection, as adopted. by Great Britain, it can hardly be denied that the consequences of encouraging too clear-cut nationalist bias in policy. ma; without the closest" vigilance, comprise the complete obstrac-
ithe economic strain under which tion of measures for relieving the present system is. liable otherwise to crack. The impend-ug Conference at Lausanne by' far the most important event n the world's fixture list at the moment. Noone " who has studied the course of the Ger man Presidential and the Prussian elections can fail to grasp that point. The salvation of Germany is not w national issu it is essentially international a {the question that really remains jis whether the statesmen of Europe and America have or can command sufficient confidence to and politically, miki press that point home, logical; Tarning to China, the same lesson in another' and, "yet, hardly less acute form is to be found. At the first blush the criticism of certain Cantonese politicians who affect to see in the Shanghai Agreement" the victory of Japan and the betrayal Jof China ought to be dismissed fas the irresponsible and. implacable utterances of men who see in every issue merely an opportunity" for. venting their spleen on' political opponents. To Mr. Eugene Chen, for example, it might be retorted that he has held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs for'a short {time since the Manchurian affair land he did not remarkably contribute or show any signs of contributing to the solution of that problem on the basis realities and facts. The merits jof the Agreement lie in. it application of compromise, practical considerations, The idea that the Chinese signatures were given merely with the intention in reserve of consolidating anti-Japanese activities is creditable neither to the commonsense nor to the good {faith of the "signatories. "The conference was directly the out: League. successful come of China' recourse to the Its by Japan—in spite of other liner
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.