Oct. 2.
The British Government's readiness to give its good offices in assisting in the composure of Sino-Japanese differences seems to be twofold. Viscount. Cranborne's statement at Geneva suggests the possibility of a conference of nations who, whether members of the League or not, are vitally concerned in Far Eastern peace. It recalls Mr. S, M. Bruce's earlier proposal for a. conference of Pacific powers, but it does not, apparently, endorse the belief that the time'is ripe for action on those lines. Lord Cranborne's emphasis on the need for confining peacemaking efforts to measures which have a real chance of success is important. Experience shows that elaborate plans for that kind of international] movement are best deferred-unless they can result in proposals which both contestants are likely to accept. At the moment no such hope can be entertained. The senselessness of the struggle is, however, brought again to attention by the British' representative's significant comparison of the intrinsic import ance of the Marco Polo Bridge incident with the large-scale military and naval aggression Taunched by Japan against China. That! fundamental point must be borne in mind, It is vividly impressed on the sympathies of other nations, if only by reason of the heavy] losses which, as third parties, they have] incurred in the course of the struggle. Here in Shanghai there is no diffeulty in appreciate ing this point; the almost complete stagnation of the commercial life of this nerve centre is serious matter for all. It reflects condi-tons, in greater or less degree, in other parts of the country, where hostilities are in progress, The offer of Great Britain to} mediate "if the need should arise" is the second, perhaps, the more practical proposal} put forward by the British Cabinet, It gives a further reason for the firm refusal to countenance or approve the suggested boycott} of Japanese goods.
If mediation is to be acceptable to both parties—an essential condition prezedent—the mediator cannot be identified with a} concrete act of hostility to either one of them. Apart from that axiomatic truth, Great} Britain has never been enamoured of the boycott weapon. In the form of economic sanctions it was officially adopted in the recent efforts of the League to bring pressure} to bear on Italy. It was a dismal failure. Yet British objections to it are based on Jonger and wider experience. Enforeement} of a boycott invariably involves the use of} methods which lead to violence. Whatever may be the moral purpose originally inspiring} ft, it becomes rapidly exploited by trade interests which cannot help giving it a predominantly selfish motive. There is nothing so nauseating as the spectacle of a country stimulating the sale of its products in the name of morality. Practically too there is} 'a grave objection to any measure which} artificially interrupts the normal flow of} trade. Sooner or later there has to be a} restoration of the currents and the process} seldom impressive, involving as it frequently does a virtual repudiation of principles previously affirmed. Finally, as} with economic sanctions, the danger of} intensifying rather than eliminating the risks} of war is always present. So it is not surprising that, despite certain demonstrations} public opinion, the British Government is} not disposed to encourage the Archbishop Canterbury to prescribe an economic antitoxin for Japan's malady. Japan has maintained that her main difficulty with China is economic, it is true. That is the one comprehensible item in her list of alleged grievances. It can be met, not as she is now} trying to meet it, by spreading destruction far and wide, but by a real approach to equal partnership on lines acceptable to both countries. That is where British mediation might be effective if it could be accepted—a condition which has yet to} be established. Although the world's condemnation of the policy of indiscriminate bombing is natural and salutary, it might develop into an obstacle to peace, and, consequently, defeat the objects of its amiable} supporters. If it is allowed to get out of control it will certainly stiffen the obduracy of Japan, just as Japan's reckless use of the aeroplane has undoubtedly stimulated Chinese} resistance and gravely complicated the task of reconeiliation—a state of relationships which the two countries will ultimately have to accept. So long as the present state of war exists Chinese spokesmen are bound to} exploit to the full the sympathies which must} be aroused by the grim holocausts in so many] of their cities. Yet third parties, while in way: surrendering their humanitarian principles, should recognize that the basic issue is to be found in the development of} modern weapons of war and the vastly] extended conceptions of conflict generated by] their potentialities. It is exceedingly difficult} to draw the exact line between what is and] what is not a military objective. When, on the top of this difficulty, the disparity between man's power of invention and his ability to} control what he has invented comes into play, the Jonger of allowing well-intcations emotions to get the upper hand of national judgment will be readily perceived. This} does not rebut the plain fact that China is the victim of unjustifiable aggression and consequently the appropriate recipient of sympathy and encouragement. It does not} preclude whole-hearted condemnation of} those indiscriminate bombings which, despite the unequivocal assertions of Japanese apologists, have undoubtedly marred the record of} the invaders. Tt is merely concerned to show that if mediation is to have any chance of success at this stage, the mediator-designate cannot afford to. be heavily committed to an} attitude which' might be taken to prejudge the issue, Tt is unfortunate that Japan has, so far, [shown a great lack of appreciation of the} depth of feeling aroused by her naval and military assaults on the world's sense of
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.