The Archive · 1937

A Gleam of Light

Prince Konoye seems, judging from his latest pronouncement, to be heedful of the criticism which Japan's present policy has aroused in Europe and America. It is true that he ascribes that criticism to a "misunderstanding" just as he explains that Japan's aggression which he considers to be a defensive gesture has been prompted by China's failure to understand Japanese friendship. His assurances that the Emperor Kang Teh, of whom it is noteworthy that Japanese official statements now speak as Pu Yi again, will not be restored to the Dragon Throne at Peiping and that the Open Door, of 19th century fame, will not be closed by Japanese policy will be duly noted. Coming from the Prime Minister of Japan they can hardly be dismissed as valueless, although active memories will recall that Count Uchida, speaking deliberately at Mukden as the mouthpiece of the Japanese Government, declared in November 1931 that the then ex-Emperor Pu Yi would neither be encouraged to take part in Manchurian affairs nor be used as an instrument of Japanese policy. Nor is it inappropriate to consider how far the Open Door has availed the foreign merchant in the new state of Manchoukuo, over which the Emperor Kang Teh with full support from Japan now presides, However that may be, the less menacing tone of Prince Konoye's statement deserves consideration. Even if it reaffirms the view that third-party mediation in the current conflict is not required, it is not hostile to the proposal for a conference of the signatories to the Nine Power Treaty, but quite properly suggests that Japanese policy on that point cannot be defined until an invitation to attend the conference has been issued. Differences of opinion regarding the relevancy of present Japanese actions in China to a policy of peace are not necessarily unbridgable and it is all to the good that Prince Konoye takes the trouble to assert that peace and friendly relations with other powers are still the aim of Japan. That isa gleam of light in an otherwise murky atmosphere.

In such a mood it is not impossible for Prince Konoye to be open to revision of his views on the fundamental causes of disagreement between Japan and China. For example, his persistence in regarding the "anti-Japanese" attitude of the Chinese Government and the communist tendencies of its leaders as the main offence should be capable of appeasement if the facts be carefully reviewed. So far from embracing communism the authorities at Nanking, ever since the Sian affair of last year, have firmly differentiated between the exotic theories of the communist armies and the economic grievances which they professed to champion in the name of Chinese nationalism. The result, greatly facilitated by Japan's invasion, has been to break down the barriers formerly dividing the communists from the followers of the Kuomintang and, on Nankings terms, ihe communists are now merged in the national forces. It may be assumed that this union will enable the Chinese Government to give closer attention to the legitimate claims of the converts to its fold but nothing in the programme supports the view that a communist regime will replace the Kuomintang in the development of constitutional plans, unless desperation as the result of Japanese military pressure accrues from the course of events. Until the conflict burst in the North and spread over the whole of China, the energies of the Chinese Government had been so strongly directed toward suppression of anti-Japanese activities that, not unreasonably, they were criticized at times as unduly fettering the exercise of the right of free speech. General Chiang Kaishek had to endure internal attacks on the ground that he was in danger of yielding too much to Japanese claims. It was obvious to all, except apparently the Government at Tokyo, that the cumulative effect of the militarist programme which led from the creation of the autonomous regime of East Hopei, the ever-increased dominance of Japanese authority in Peiping, the smuggling troubles in the North, the undermining of the administrative fabric of the International Settlement in Hongkew, to the clash at Marco Polo Bridge would be to make the Chinese Government's position impossible unless it called a halt in the name of national soli-clarity.

These facts are imperfectly grasped by Japanese critics who now seem to imagine that foreign views are coloured by unscrupulous Chinese propaganda and uneasy apprehension for foreign interests. Making all allowances for the emotions of the boycott agitation (which this journal has condemned), it must be reiterated that the root cause of the world's anxiety lies in the recognition that, as President Franklin Roosevelt, Mr. Neville Chamberlain and M. Yvon Delbos have in their different ways asserted, the basis of Japan's actions here rests on the use of force to override observance of solemn treaty engagements. Technical disquisitions of the technical question of bombing from the air do not dispose of the awkward fact that the principles, conservatively stated in the British Note which dealt with the attack on His Majesty's Ambassador, six weeks ago, have not been fully observed. Japanese intentions to confine aerial and other offensive action to military or quasi-military objectives may be accepted, but unfortunately the interpretations applicable to many tragedies arising therefrom are not free from criticism. For instance, it is blandly suggested that because certain educational institutions are suspected of "anti-Japanese" prejudices their exposure to military correction is permissible. Nor is it by any means clear that a deliberate campaign of bombing Chinese cities throughout the length and breadth of the land can be justified on the ground that such action is concerned only with military targets, and that its destruction of non-combatant life and property is unavoidably accidental. Japanese apologists may rightly cast doubt on exaggerations which naturally appear in Chinese as in their own partisan statements, but they would do well to give some credit to the intelligence of statesmen who have ample means for checking the data thus forthcoming. There is far too much talk of propaganda in the hope of allaying uneasy consciences. As a rule, public opinion the world over has its own way of judging the broad facts of an international situation.

Prince Konoye's more receptive attitude gives rise to the hope that he is beginning to be impressed by that consideration,

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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