Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Koki Hirota, the War Minister, Gen Sugiyama, and the Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai, make interesting reading, Each approaches the Sino-Japanese hostilities from the particular point of view of his own department and their pronouncements give a very clear picture of the policy of Tokyo, its hapes and its fears. Prince Konoye's message is remarkably important because of the implications it conveys. Following the fall of Nanking, he is reported as saying, the National Government of China has become "a weapon in the hands of the Communist Party, a de: ive organization." One of the weasons given for the present hostilities was Japan's desire to save China from communism. The Chinese Government denied that it leant towards that doctrine, and that denial was emphasized by the readiness with which the Chinese Communist forces, ceased their rebellion against the government, and, at any rate for the durati the hostilities, submerged themselves: armies of the nation. A common danger brought about a unity of purpose in which Nanking made no concession to the rebels, but received their assistance against the enemy. Prince Konoye now claims that since the fall of Nanking a state of affairs has been brought about, which it was the desire of the Japanese government to prevent, The Chinese will naturally deny that this has happened and that there has been no change in the political complexion of their government, and, on the facts, it would seem that this contention is correct. But if it is not, on whom does the responsibility rest? This journal has pointed out consistently that Japanese action is likely to throw China directly into the arms of Moscow. It has not yet occurred, but, if that is the final result, Japan will have only herself to blame. Nations in desperation are apt to turn.to any other country which will render them assistance, postponing the counting of the cost until more peaceful times. China has been obliged to turn to Russia for material help, which has now apparenty been afforded, but it is not yet true that in return it has abandoned the principles upon which its gov ernment is based in favour for the Russian doctrine. Should it do so the effect would be just as harmful to foreign interests as the present policy of Japan.
The Foreign Minister is more concerned with the effect of Japanese action in China upon world opinion, and particularly upon Anglo-Japanese relations. It is a matter for extreme regret that at a time when movements were afoot to bring about a greater degree of cordiality between the two nations, Japanese action in China should have—only temporarily it is to be hoped—frustrated them. Mr. Hirota realized Great Britain's grave concern for her old and important interests in China because of the political implications of current events and went on to give the assurance that Japan has no desire to violate them. It is quite possible to accept the assurance concerning Japan's desire in this matter, but the real test is to be found in what is happening. British interests in China are threatened, they are suffering, and the damage done has already assumed gigantic proportions. The same may be said of other nations interested in China.
The 1055 of trade—and that is all most of their people ate here for—is amply demonstrated in the Customs' returns, the destruction of capital values is only too apparent to those who have witnessed the devastation wrought in the environs of Shanghai, while the reduction of vast areas in China to practical destitution must have a profound effect upon those same foreign interests which Mr, Hirota: has expressed such fervent desire not to harm. If there is any misunderstanding, such as that of which the Japanese leaders complain, it must be realized that it arises from an inability to reconcile the sentiments which they express with the actualities of the situation. The assurances given are at such complete variance with what is happening that not even the adroitest orgyment can effect a reconciliation.
Therein lies the whole crux of the matter, and the sooner is understood the sooner will a proper appreciation of the situation by the Japanese become possible. In considering this aspect of the matter the rights or wrongs of the issue between China and Japan need not be imported into the argument. The fact is that enormous damage is being done to neutral foreign interests in China, and it is because of that, that the world watches events here with such grave anxiety.
Again Mr. Hirota's message may be quoted. "We also hope that Britain will make every effort to prevent a dislocation of the traditionally amicable Anglo-Japanese relations," he said. The mutuality of obligation in any friendship can be specifically instanced by the substitution of the word "Japan" for "Britain" in the foregoing sentence. Britain is entitled to expect that Japan will also make every effort, arid it is because the impression that Japan is failing in this respect is gaining ground that so much uneasiness exists, Sound British opinion is not even now unfriendly to Japan. It is at the moment highly critical, and for this Japan has only herself to blame, There is no more desire to see China become bolshevized in London than there is in Tokyo. The difference of opinion arises from opposite beliefs, and it must be realized that the propinquity of Japan to China, important though it is, does not constitute the former country the sole judge of what is occurring here. Occidental belief, certainly in Britain, is that China was in no danger of going communistic, that Japan created her own Bobo for the purpose of destroying it, and if, as Prince Konoye seems to suggest, the fall of Nanking has intensified the Chinese trend towards communism, which this journal does not believe, may it not be that the bogey is being transformed into a Frankenstinian monster by Japan's own actions? That is certainly an aspect of the matter which requires consideration, though what can be done about it now it is not easy to perceive. And one other point. The world still remembers comparatively recent Japanese slogans of "Hands off China," and "Asia for the Asiatics." It finds it somewhat difficult to reconcile present assurances with past expressions f policy concerning China, and if it still looks with suspicion on recent developments, it can hardly be blamed. The remedy lies in Japan's hands, and she alone can apply it
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.