Mar, 29.
The immediate achievement of the British Disarmament proposals is to give a new lease of life to the Disarmament Conferlence which, for the last three Jmonths or more, has been deadlocked. As has already been explained the urgency of the need for such action has consisted li the discovery by the economic experts that the World Economic Conference would be unlikely to achieve anything unless some definite decision had resulted from the protracted proceedings lof the Disarmament Conference. The logic of this discovery re-[quires little exposition. "Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's profound Jconviction that the association lof the nations in a joint discussion of, the economic situation might bring about a reformative understanding has led him to i tervene with characteristic 1n-conventionality by direct ap. proach to Rome and Paris, The result of his flying visits—the epithet is as appropriate to the British as well as to the Chinese [Government nowadays—has been to evoke from Signor Mussolini jo notable proposal and to en-fable the British Government. to put forward a composite plan for Disarmament which, at the outset, has had a favourable reception from the thirty-four nations represented in the Conferlence. Sir John Simon hax outlined the plan with the lucidity for which he is noted. A month Jwill now elapse before the mather is actively discussed, Mean-ile the plan will be subjected to the formidable ordeal of criism by the experts of the various nations and whether it will suffer the fate of its predecessors which were eventually smothered by too much examina. tion remains to be seen. It cannot be said that conditions are very favourable, except in one respect: the general impression lof urgency which has been born lof appreciation of the advancing dangers of European uneasiness.
The way in which the Great Powers handle the situation will be an important factor in secur-jing the success of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's plan. The British Government happily claims special credit for the provisions drafted. The plan is borrow-fed from various preceding schemes, Perhaps it were permissible to say that its details Jare less important than the manner of its commendation to the various countries concerned. There is ground for detecting in Paris an attitude of judicious leaution which does not shake bein the French Government' own approval. The difficulty seems to lie in the extent. to which the proposals are linked up with Treaty Revision, That the various Treaties must sooner or later come under critical review with the object of amendment can hardly be gain said. Germany, of course, makes no bones about her views on. the subject. Yet the mere mention lof Revision may have a turbing effect on countries like those of the Little En-toute, They have not all settled down to the conditions imposed by the territorial changes of the Treaties. While, in the conference room, they may be ready individually to discuss amiably ind practically the adjustment lof individual claims, they would be alarmed at any' attempt to nake Treaty Revision at once an important platform of European policy. In other words they will bitterly resent any suggestion that the Great Powers should, for the sake of composing the whole European situation, appear to dictate arbitrary adjustments to the smaller nations, This is perhaps better realised in Paris than in London. On the other side of the Channel it ig not always possible for Great Britain to get under the skin of the statesman of the Danube. Even the adherence of Signor Mussolini to the general move for security is not likely to console the anxious Foreign Offices in Belgrade, Bukarest, and Prague. France can be trusted to exercise her influence with due sense of responsibility but no-one knows better than she the risks of too readily a cepting the thesis of Treaty Revision, Recent events in Germany have not accentuated anxiety as much might have been expected six months earlier. Europe had $0 Jong expected the advent of Herr Hitler to power that the event, as so often happens, has proved less terrible than the prospect of it. Yet it would be fatuous to ignore the dangerous possibilities of some declared axioms of the new German policy. The close German rapprochement with Aus-trio, where Hungary, too, is regaining favour, cannot be logically resented. Its bearing on the Treaties was exemplified not so long ago over the attempted Customs Union pact. That aspect of European gravitation will} have to be carefully and sym pathetically handled. Another and vividly disquieting portent i= to be found in Poland where the restraining influence of Franc wit have to be vigilant if mis takes by a too eager and not too conciliatory Foreign Minister ave to be prevented. The other day, trouble at Danzig was fortunately averted by good sense dish both Herr Hitler's, danger lies in the possibi the occurrence of some in set alight a conflagrae conceivable that the investiture of the Nazi Party power may lead to a modification of those fiery vations which have so stimulated the. anti-German vehemence of the Polish, press. Underlying the problem the Disarmament programme are these important national difiieul= ties. The chief sponsors of the scheme now officially brought forward by Great Britain will have the hest chance of success if, by. some welkdevised statement of policy, they can give their: coun= tenance to gradual and direct re. adjustment of the relationships between the various contiguous countries of Central Europe. Thus they may reduce the eral idea of Treaty Revision piecemeal operation of practical compromises, voluntarily offered and accepted by the principals cones ned, rather than exalt it to jous essay in wholesale adjudication,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.