The latest telegrams suggest that there is a danger that the Anglo-Eire conference which was to open in London yesterday will probably fail on the question of the union of Northern Ireland with the new state under Mr. de Valera. That is not the only subject to be discussed in London, for there are the questions of a trade agreement between the two negotiating parties, and the defence of Ireland to be considered. With regard to the former, the economic war, which arose out of the refusal of Mr. de Valera to continue the payment of the Land Annuities to Great Britain, it has long been conceded that it has proved of no real benefit to either, and probably the only justification for its continuance lies in the fact that it was embarked upon for the vindication of Britain's well defined rights in the matter, and amounted to an effort to extract from the Free State's trade with the mother country by means of customs tariffs sums on which the Free State government had defaulted. The trouble may be settled by some sort of compromise. It is hoped that this will be the case, for Great Britain would display lamentable weakness were it to abandon the position it has already taken up and make a complete surrender on the point. It may be argued that concessions have to be made, but there is not a little ground for suggesting that Mr. de Valera's policy towards Whitehall has all along been so opportunist that a very unpleasant word might with perfect justice be applied to it. The defence of Eire is a British responsibility and in addition to the fact that Queenstown and Berehaven are used as naval bases, there is also the proposal to establish in the country an adequate air base. The existence of the naval bases has consistently been resented by the party which Mr. de Valera leads as amounting to a derogation of the country's complete independence. Nevertheless they are essential to any scheme for the defence of the whole of the British Isles and though there is that objection to them, it is difficult to see how Great Britain can make any change in her policy in that respect.
Reading between the lines it is apparent that Mr. de Valera is taking two pigs to market in exchange for which he requires payment in the shape of the embodiment of Northern Ireland into the state which he has succeeded in forming. He hopes by making suitable concessions over the question of the economic war and the defence of Ireland to persuade Whitehall to agree to the union of Ireland and thereby bring about the complete state of Eire, which when persuade ing the Dail to accept that name, he stated was his object. The existence in Dublin of general opinion to the effect that Eire should embark on a programme of national defence means very little. It is certain that Eire as it is now, or even with the inclusion of Northern Ireland would be in no financial position to provide defence calculated to be able to withstand aggression without assistance from Great Britain. That assistance would have to be given in any event, for the rest of the United Kingdom would not tolerate for one moment the occupation of southern Ireland by any alien State. It follows, therefore, that even if Ireland could afford the establishment and maintenance of adequate defences, there would be no particular relief to British responsibilities in the matter, for Britain would, despite it, have to make her own provisions against any such unfortunate situation arising. The propinquity of Ireland to the rest of the British Isles must always complicate the consideration of such demands as Mr. de Valera may bring forward, but it is quite clear that Whitehall will make no concessions which might ultimately embarrass the defence of the United Kingdom as a whole. A threat to deny the use of the two naval bases might cause grave concern, but it should be remembered that that right is conveyed by agreement, the denunciation of which might lead to other and more serious difficulties, as much for Dublin as for whitehall.
The Loyalist Party in Northern Ireland is naturally perturbed by the statement that partition is in the melting pot, and the possibility of infan being agreed to by Great Britain. The attitude of unconcern taken up by Viscount Graigavon shows complete conviction that Britain will make no concessions on that point. It is unbelievable that she would throw the Loyalists into the maw of the irridentist majority dominating Eire. It would amount to a most disgraceful betrayal of well defined understanding and a reproach to the honour of any government deciding to do so. Therein lies the danger of this present conference coming to naught. Mr. de Valera is seeking a bargain which it will be hard to strike. He is reported to have expressed his realization of the great difficulties which have to be overcome. They are in this connection almost, if not quite insuperable. There will be every possible agreement with his statement that "As far as the Irish tion is concerned we earnestly desire to lay foundations for friendly relations between the peoples 6f the two countries."
That sentiment is undoubtedly heartily reciprocated, as is also the hope that the present conversations will make progress towards that end. But it is not unduly pessimistic to fear that little progress indeed will be made. Great Britain cannot abandon Northern Ireland, and no bargain on. $52 that basis can be made.
To secure what Mr. de Valera has to offer, and it is really not very much after all, the price paid would be the heavy price of dishonour, the sacrifice of principle to a mere shabby expedient. It is not surprising that Viscount Craigavon is so unconcerned. Nor need it be a cause for astonishment if the conference ultimately comes to naught, for it is better that Britain shauld forego whatever Mr. de Valera has to offer than obtain it at the price of her own soul.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.