May 22, An immediate reduction of the strength of the British forces, in Shanghai is not contemplated by London. The trooping programme as announced is, as usual, liable to alteration. Addi: tional permanent barrack accommodation for troops is to be provided in Hongkong. In view of offeial replies given questions in the House of Commons this information, conveyed in a special cable to this journal and published on Saturday, shows that greater or less virtue may lie in the epithet "immediate." In other words Shang. hai may before long be deprived of one of the two British battalions here on its transfer to' the permanent barracks in Hongkong. This decision, if it be made, would be regarded here exceedingly unwise, Even though the provision of permanent barracks in the Island Colony gave welcome proof of. the alertness of the British Government in strengthening its in the Far East, the of additional risks cially in the light of troubles, must cause anxiety.—Suecest spends on concentration on one's own affairs. Shanghai, on that ground alone, has the right to demur to a further weakening of its own defen: But it can quite fairly suggest that as, six years ago, the danger in which this important British Government. to send city was placed prompted the
three brigades in hot haste to China waters and to give them the comprehensive name Shanghai Defence Force, the security of Shanghai is a definite asset to the general peace of China. After a few months it was deemed possible to reduce the number of troops actually in Shanghai: to two battalions. 'The narrowness of the margin of safety thus accepted was shown early in 1982 when the Sino-Japanese trouble impelled the British authorities to send' the the 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at short' notice from Hongkong and the American Government to take the unprecedented action of reinforcing the Fouth Marines with the 81st Infantry Regiment from Manila, There is not the slightest doubt that the presence in Shanghai of these British and American troops has greatly reassured the Chinese as well the Foreign residents. The present situation in the North and the consequent uncertainty prevailing over the whole of China seems to justify the view that Shangh: security ought to of paramount importance in any general scheme for Far Eastern military defence. Since the termination of the "quasi-war" here last year nothing ans been done specific ly to suggest that the Powers who. are responsible in the last resort for Shanghai's existence have yet come to any conclusions on the all-important question of maintaining the security of the International Settlement and of preventing its exposure to those dangers which, experience tells, are likely to arise from disordered conditions in China and acute dissension between rival Chinese regional authorities. Shanghai is in the throes of unexampled de-Pression. Tt is endeavouring to face that depression calmly and repair as best it can the ravages of last year's outbreak, Making all allowances for considerations of high policy which may dictate the concentration of troops in Hongkong, the with-troops from this area seems to [be unnecessary and dangerous. In a sense these troops are performing chiefly the duties of a police force. They are also the reservers of peace in creating a feeling of security which is the best safeguard against unrest. Grave anxiety (which the Government of China makes no attengpt to conceal) over the activities of the Red Armies in considerable tracts of country gives a valid reason for deprecating any weakening of the defence of Shanghai, where communist organizations demand the sustained vigilance of the Chinese and Foreign Municipal authorities. Moreover the admirable be-ur of the British troops in Shanghai and the excellent relations established between them and the Chinese and Foreign residents alike, make them a potent influence for peace. While the British community naturally would resent a reduction in thei strength, it is not too much to say that Chinese opinion, especially at the present time, }would be extremely perturbed on that account.
Recognition of the need for stabilizing measures for the defence of British interests in the Far East may inform the decision to replace the temporary hutments at Shamshuipo—by Permanent barracks. That proof fof the British Government's! intention to maintain a vigorous policy in alert regard for the lives and property of its nation:
in China generally is welcome. ingly reassuring statement Unless some excess forthcoming on the policy to followed in respect to Shanghai, the inclusion in such a scheme of; the withdrawal of a British Battalion to Hongkong is likely to accentuate the very risks against which increased protec-ion is desired. It is true that year showed, rapidly reinforcements could be sent from Hongkon; The question susceptibility of densely populated international enclave to sudden commotion can th narded against without ceptance of risks which, in the space of a few hours, might inflict losses out of all proportion to the financial saving effected by removing one of the two Battalions to Hongkong. Pri sident Roosevelt's proposed into national pact has strengthened this objection. If that pact becomes effective the despatch of further outside the territory of a signatory will be hedge about by such serious inhibitions that the clement of promptness in releasing executive action will be immeasurably reduced. On the other hand it makes due provision for recognition of the tatus quo. therefore, a de any part of the British garrison here has reached a definite stage, its review becomes imperative jand justified in the light of the President's proposal alone, to say nothing'. of the objections t which this journal is impelled to record in reflection of Shanghai's legitimate apprehensions.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.