Regarding the Charhar situation, our policy is two-fold: On the one hand, no armed force willie employed for the solution of the problem; on the other, we will not Muraue a laissez-faire policy.
It is not only in time of national emergency that we should seek to avoid internecine strife. We should do so at all other tumes as well. Whenever it is possible to reach an amicable settlement of any pro-bern peaceful means—even when this involves more time and effort—this policy of avoiding civil warfare should' be adhered—to. 'This point has already been brought forth in my article on "Unification By, Reconstruction.'
Tt is fallacious, however, to con-dade that in order to avoid civil warfare, the Government should pursue a policy of caisse: faire in regard to the Charhar situation, Such a policy would probably lead to results even more disastrous than civil warfare. Why? In the first place, Charhar is a border province. Secondly, Chai fertile province and fare more or less desti can such a border province whose soil is not fertile and whose inhabitants are in dire distress he separated from the authority of the Central Government and still preserve itself? It will, in that event, simply follow in the steps the Three Eastern Provinces and Jehol. For this reason, the result lof a caisse: faire policy would be worse than that of civil war in the ase of Charhar.
ome people will say that Feng Vu-hsiang's occupation Charhar, as already pointed out by himself, is merely for the sake Jof resistance against the Japanese. They will moreover point to the recapture of Tolum (Die..nor) as proof of their allegation..It is even said that the moment the Central. Government renounces the North-china Truce Agreement and join in resisting the. Japanese, here will be no fear of Charhat declaring itself independent of the Central Government. Te is, there fore, wondered in certain quarters why: the Central Authorities do not net accordingly. along the Great Wall was" most My reply is: When the fighting
furious. and the Central Govern ment had to despatch troops tothe Front, the Central Authorities re-earedly ordered that all members the Military. A snust either come to. the personally of despatch deputies to fiseuss measures of national. defence. This clearly shows that the Central Government didn't. want fo. act arbitrarily and without eon-flotation. with the various leaders leon cerned. When the Truce Agreement was finally concluded, © the Central "Authorities were prepared to bear fall responsibility for. the agreement. as well as attacks from tations quarters. But. since the Rereement has now already been concluded, i be. declared null and void by any one indi We regard the Armistice Agree ment, indeed, ax a matter of great pain: but. the Bastern Provinces and. Jehol hot eliminated by the conclus of the agreement. We will. still rive for the restoration of the Three Eastern Provinces and Jehol, Dut cur efforts in this regard must well directed. Such efforts, Imoceover must be unanimous, for the question cannot be solved by larly one individual or any one part fof the country.
In the war of 1905, when the Ching "Dynasty ceded Formosa Sapan, Tang. Ching-sung and. Lin Yung'fa refused to recognise the action of the Government as valid, hich Jed to the military -oceupa: Hon. of Formosa by the Japanese. 'That was a very tragic episode in out national. history. It-must itnderstood, however, that Tang and Liu took action only after' the Government Thad "actually ceded Formosa.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.