Two countries appear at Geneva to submit their differen-Ges to the process of discussion in which they themselves take part. They both have definite Brievances the one against the other. They are both highly sensitive to criticism, They cannot make the day-to-day developments of the dispute wait on the discussion. They have not reached a point at Which either of them will admit concession to the other, although they may be prepared to dever to the friendly influences around them methods of procedure, the employment of arguments and other, incidental though im-Portant features of the di cussion, Available is a seard ing report on the issues volved: it is framed in a spin of detachment, with the desire to help solution rather than pass i Judgment, It does not, on that Account, lack material of which each principal can make good use in enforcing its own Associated in the discussion representatives of countries which, while perhaps ready to Perceive theoretical conclusions clear. culated to prejudice a re tion and, indeed, embark ing to their own problems elsewhere, That in sum is the task which the League of Nations has Ving in dealing with the Sino-Japanese issue. It has been hailed for some months as a test of the League's vitality Possibilities of—the breaking down under the strain have been taken into account, Even now it would be rash to assert that those possibilities have been excluded. Yet, after ly six weeks during which no definite decision has been recorded, the League has still control." The two principals have acquitted themselves with credit and the road to settlement, if not clearly defined, is certainly not blocked. Moreover signs of a desire to pass from the council chamber—to the committee room where the spirit of compromise and friendly agreement can find ampler Scope are active. Adjournment of the whole discussion for a fortnight on this understanding has been achieved. That may fairly describe the course of the "Sino-Japeyese debates Geneva.
Can this be regarded as indicating the failure of the League—and therefore of the members composing it—to act up to the principles of its constitution? Some there are who would at once endorse the verdict that the League had failed and, in truth, be little concerned thereat. They would belittle the significance of the League and welcome occasion for digging its grave. Others, also convinced of failure, are' keenly alive to the seriousness of any set-back to the movement of which the League is the outward and visible sign. Yet this pessimism—on one side exultant, on the other rueful—is unjustified. In military language the League has maintained its front intact and it has not lost. the power of initiative. Rapid or Spectacular success would ha belied the gravity of the issues at stake or would, have done injustice to the realities embodied in the League. Such a view does not ignore the grounds on which disappointment been expressed, notably ardent. champions. of China's case. It is being Yreely stated that the League has failed to do justice to China, that the leading Members of the "League have used their influence to shield Japan. Stimulus to this belief has been given by outside comment which is not under the obligation to conform to. ihe League's discipline. It is possible to note in that comment the expression of hostility which has its root in other than the Sino-Japanese issue. That aspect can be—should be—disregarded. Attention were better paid to the arguments which, on its own merits, find the League at fault. They centre on the contention that Japan, as the Aggressor from September 18, 1931, is being too delicately treated. They point to Japane: threat of withdrawal at. vane critical stages as proof that the League has been craven-hearted. Yet these arguments emanate from sources which have, so far as can be gathered, warmly commended the Lytton Report. That document is the League's chief mentor and it says explicitly:
"This is not a case in which one country has declared" war on another country without. previously exhausting "the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple ease, of the violation "of one country, by the armed forces. of a neighbouring country, consistently with, id_peace, the permanent interests of China and Japan Manchuria,.. a mere restoration of the statis quo would be no solution... the maintenance and recognition' of the present regime in Manchuria (Manchukuo) would be equally unsatisfactory. "Such a solution does not appear to use compatible with the fundamental principles of existing—international obligations, nor with the good understanding' between. the two countries upon which peace in the Far East depends. It is opposed to the interests of Chin: It disregards the wishes of the People of Manchuria, and it is at least questionable" whether it would ultimately service the permanent interests of Japan."
That appreciation prevents the League—apart altogether from Japanese threats—from proceeding to condemnation of Japan in the judicial sense and, as has been consistently urged in these columns, judicial condemnation is not "the function of the League. The great achievement of the debates at Geneva is that been taken to weaken of this verdict of Commission. standpoint it may be regarded as highly satisfactory that the course of the discussion: term used in no depreciatory That defensive has been ily conducted and not without signs of a conciliatory spirit creditable to a Government in the present position of in. Tokyo cannot fail to that, even if the status quo cannot be restorea, failure to come more sure] into line with principles of the likely to have sinister its in the future. Whether culminating—point Japanese self-confidence has been reached cannot be determined. The significance of the defensive should not, however, be ignored. It is a strong proof of the exercise of the League's corrective influence. At the same time it is natural that Chinese memories should hark back to 1919 when Japanese threats of withdrawal from the League induced President Wilson to acquiesce in the Shantung claims and, as it turned out, lost for ' the Treaty and Covenant, of which he was the chief. inspiration, the support of the United States of America. The Washington Conference restored Shantung to China but not America to the League. The League's chief difficulty, however unpalatable to China, lies in the weakness of China's own internal position: It was brought home forcibly to Geneva last year when the request that Japan should withdraw to the Iway zone and leave China responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the invade
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.