The Archive · 1933

CONTACT NEEDED

Mar, Mr. Wang Ching-wpi, arrival at Nanking, is reported To have advocated 'a "policy of diplomacy on the one hand and resistance against the Japanese invaders simultaneously." He went on to qualify this statement by the assertion that direct negotiation was ""obviously an impossibility" at the moment and the only" course "at Present open to ux for the salvation of the nation" vas "active resistance against the enemy." No-one will belittle the courage and heroism of the Chinese troops who have been Laying down their lives in the North against an overwhelming-better armed and better-equipped enemy. The requisite discounting of the messages received from Peking does not weaken that impression of unavailing bravery. On broad grounds too it is dificult to argue that resistance, even at fearful odds, should be de-precited. Apart from the recent arrival of Japanese cops. the hither side of the Great 'Wall, it must not be forgotten that' the recent operations which have established Japanese control up to the Great Wall, involve the wresting from China, of not merely the whole of the Jehol but nearly one-third of the province of—Chihli which, although lying north of the Wall, can by no stretch of argument be accounted part of Manchuria, rich though it be in natural resources. There is no need to emphasise the unreality of the contention that vast masses of Chinese troops are Prepared to move from the South in action against the invaders. If General Chiang Kabshek wore a hundred times a better selfer than he is, he could not possibly marshal xo heterogeneous a conglomeration of forces in effective disposition against the Japanese. The ernment has neither the material esources nor the staff to give him for that purpose. He him self knows only too well the Limitations of his command. At the best the operations whi have been directly approved by him may be described ax delay ing tactics designed. as far as possible, to give him and the Government breathing space for reviewing the whole position. The danger lies in the time factor, The Jupanese Gener Staff does not depend on tiers communiques. Tt plans and the machine which it directo can acquire increased momentum as each day passes.

Mr. Wang Ching-wei and his colleagues will, itis to be hoped, appreciate the difficulty of General Chiang Kai-shek' task. The argument that direct negotiation with Japan possible can be based only on one ground: fear of the political capital Likely to be made out of the general ignorance of the public, There is, on the Japanese side, no reluctance to enter into discussion, but, of cour as the drift develops, so may the claims of the Japanese be enhanced. The appetite of the General Staf may grey eating. Nor can it be contended that frank admission of weakness will damage the Chinese cause; the Japanese have as accurate a perception of the exact value of Chinese mil Yesources as the Eh ment, in its innermost must hold. Only ansympathe sion will fail to recognise the extremity of the Goverment at Nanking. The true course of courage lies, however, in advocacy of the, very contact which Mr Wane" Chingwei appears to. regard as impossible. 'so far the public has been treat. led to piecemeal revelations of the truth and an overabundance lof speciously framed declarations of an unreal intention to resist. Each leader seems fear that if he commits himself to frank recognition facts, his political opponents and, Perhaps, even some of his own colleagues may make of his statements cause for his exposure to popular odium. So, official coun. tenance is_given to such well-meaning efforts as the collection. lof funds for aeroplanes without apparent regard to the blunt fact that those efforts are merely Wasting "mover which might be better applied elsewhere. Reliance is placed on spasmodic allusions to the strength of the boycott as a retort to military power, in [supreme disregard of the damage: which that' boomerang.like weapon does to China's own weakened economic resources and of the ultimate failure which must arise from the eventual assertion of the normal needs of the Chinese people.~ Against an' undeclared enemy "furnished with 'a definite purpose and the will to effect it, it is utterly futile to set in motion shifts, evasions, petulant postures and fitful, it gallant, Perhaps it is permissible to imagine what might be done by national Government elsewhere in such a case. There would be a comprehensive survey of the situation in its military and political aspects. There would be a mutual abandonment of Internal political dissension for the time being. There would be a joint acceptance of a joint isto, without any attempt to inflict penalties for its having. arisen. There would be an appeal to all the Provinces to take heed to their own security while the Central authorities were, ztappling, with solution of the main torsion problem. of the moment. A frank but reassure ing appreciation of the position might be issued to the public who should be impressed by the lear sanity of the course which would obviate the graver dangers of " hopeless military adventure and would by the process of cutting losses, restore the situation to some degree of stability fand—pesce. Diplomatic contact can be readily made with Japan because relations between the two countries officially subsist. The only thing that obstructs it ix the apparent inability Chinese political leaders to create among themselves 2 spirit lof mutual trust, in the face of ional emergency. The question is whether at Nanking there is the greatness of leadership. It may be argued that the "popular" mind would not tolerate treating with the enemy in the ate. Whether the Cov-lornment, in association with the at brains in China—for clearly the case demands some forrit of coalition—can control the Vivaeity of that mind must be left to the Government to mer. Certainly the mind of japan is outside such influence. Objections to the abandonment of a vain resistance because it would be resented by sections of opinion which would not and cannot do hand's {urn to improve resistance are utterly invalid. The Government show follow up Mr. T. V. Soong's re-feet speech by' extending its criticism of the militarist leader: tothe whole of the count [Political and. administrative personnel. On that basis it. should decide, in the country's own interests, to proceed direct into contact with Japanese diplomacy. This is the moment. Delay may shake the influence of the considerations which make Japanese policy unwilling to venture too far beyond the Great y Wall, Significant to most orities the calm indifference displayed the bulk of the people towards cathe reports of fierce fighting in the North. Clearer proof of the Government's chaute to win support for a sensible policy of negotiation "ould hardly be given. Heroies ave out of place: prosaic attention to the business ect this - exceedingly dangerous and unnecessarily menacing situation is required from the Government.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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