Oct. 20.
That the editors of Chinese newspapers in Hongkong have sent a message protesting against the censorship of war news from Canton, and the dissemination of incorrect reports is not to be wondered at, for judging from what has appeared in recent months in the Hongkong journals and comparing it with the facts as they were ultimately revealed, it is apparent that the Hongkong. public has not been kept well informed. The. Prevention of the spread of news likely to be of interest to the enemy is always a legitimate function of any command, but the suppres~ sion of the news of victories or defeats does to make up its own mind that degree of justice will be done which the situation demands. There should be no question of any British coercion on a subject upon which Northern Ireland is fully capable of making up its own mind, But Mr. de Valera places the whole matter} in a sinister light when he warns England. that the chanees of Eire's ce-operation with Great Britain in the event of a European war are slight so long as the partition re~ mains. It is the duty of statesmen to take advantage of every situation as opportunity occurs, and it is obvious that he looks towards the pressure of other European events to force the hand of Great Britain in making. the required concession in its own defence. If the Union is at such a low ebb that it is necessary to purchase the assistance of the Irish Free State at the cost of a grave injustice to Northern Ireland, then it seems to be hardly worth defending. It the moral questions involved are capable of settlement such a poor basis they are no longer' moral nor even questions. Real morality' @emands as much freedom for Northern Ire land as Mr, de Valera so persistently claims for that portion of the island under his leadership. Of that there can be no gainsaying, for if the British control of Ireland in the past was so iniquitous from the point of view of principle, then, obviously the transfer: of Northern Ireland to a control for which it has not the slightest use would be just as grave an injustice. Not only that, it is a wholly unacceptable contention that a section of Ireland which has remained faithful to the Union, and refused to follow the path selected by Mr. de Valera and his followers, should in fact be forced to secede and become a minority under a government in which its people do not trust. The division is none of England's making: it was not England which tore Northern Ireland from. the Free State, but Northern Ireland which Yefused to leave the Union.
That contention is reinforced by Lord] Craigavon's reply to Mr. de Valera uring the years T have been in office, I have seen no signs of change in the sentiment) of Northern Iréland,—indeed, the loyalty and affection of the people of Northern Ireland towards the British Crown are stronger today' than at any time in her history. 'Therefore, Mr. de Valera can cease using Northern Ireland as a weapon to threaten the Government at Whitehall. I can only reiterate the old battle ery of Northern Ireland: 'No surrender.'
Mr. de Valera has no charge to make against Whitehall that Northern Treland' is in any way being oppressed, and that his! demands are inspired by a desire to protect! people of his own nationality. So far from that, the majority in the: north favour continuance of the existing arrangement, and, what is more, are definitely opposed to any' change in their status such as Mr. de Valera desires. Because he wants it 0, is no reason why his wish should be gratified, and the loyalty of Northern Ireland must be reciprocated by the rest of the Union. That loyalty, however, also requires that if at any time it did desire union with the Free State it! [should be granted. That is most definitely the attitude adopted by the British Government, and the question of union or disunion in Ireland is one for the North to decide solely by itself. There will certainly be no British influence used either one way or the other. The threat implied in Mr. de Valera's statement must be taken for what it is worth. not come within that category. Obviously, the enemy is perfectly well aware whether Ihe has been victorious or defeated, and the publication of such information or its suppression can have no real military significance. The question does arise, however, whether, for the purpose of fostering morale, such news should not be withheld from the public. It is quite likely that if the Chinese had all along been kept acquainted with the military reverses they have been suffering {their morale might have seriously deterior~ fated. On the other hand it might not, and it is only by empiric test that the best method in the circumstances can be ascertained. The [Chinese editors in Hongkong claim that they should be given correct information no matter how unpalatable it may be, and there may be much sound common sense in that contention. Neverilieless there are cer~ tain circumstances surrounding the Japanese descent upon Kwangtung which may make. the Chinese military reluctant to permit the public knowing the dimensions of the blow which is apparently being inflicted in this latest development. Undoubtedly the rapidity with which the Japanese have advanced into the interior since their landing in Bias Bay; Jand the comparatively feeble resistance which has been offered to them, may not only afford some ground for Chinese criticism. of their military command, but may induce panic which must be avoided if sterner' opposition is to be effected.
The amazing feature of this latest development is that while the possibility of it occurring was recognized,—that is indicated by the construction of concrete defences. jand the like—the Chinese were so completely taken by surprise that they were unable to take up the positions which had already been prepared. Indeed it would seem that the Chinese either completely' ignored the potentialities of the situation, or were convinced for some reason or other that the Japanese would never land troops in the south. Yet it has been apparent for months past, and the Japanese have publicly discussed it, that sooner or later the Japanese command would take the action they have. The only real cause for wonder' is that they have delayed so long in doing, it The main reason for the delay, apart from purely political considerations, appears! to have been the desire of the Japanese command to force the Chinese to concentrate upon the defence of Hankow, and the manner in which the Chinese have committed most of their material to that area Suggests that reports to the effect that. the only material available to resist the Japanese. consists of provincial levies with: out any mechanized assistance are in the main correct. The problem which the (Chinese have to solve is whether they can afford to detail reinforcements from the Hankow area to assist in the defence of Canton, or abandon Hankow in the hope of] saving Canton, or remain where they are fand let the southern port go. The speed with which the Japanese are advancing in the south will in all probability decide the matter for them, for if they do succeed in reaching the Canton-Hankow Railway from Waichow via Lungmoon the principal route for Chinese reinforcements will have been severed making it impossible for them to' reach Canton in time for it to be saved. On the map the time factor seems already to be operating against the Chinese and they will in all probability continue their stand around. Hankow, for a division of their strength now would seem to be fatal.
Undoubtedly with a section of Ireland not wholeheartedly committed to the defence of the Union, the position of the latter would to some extent be weakened. It would be tragically so if by any chance the Free State, in the event of war, abandoned that neutrality which is to be expected of it, but it is better that that risk should be faced, than that Whitehall should be dragooned into an abandonment of Northen Ireland in the manner which Mr. de Valera apparently contemplates. Fortunately the chances of his [success are small. Great Britain is not likely to be intimidated by any such warning, and fat the moment it does not appear that any Useful contribution has been made to the consideration of the problem involved by Mr.
Valera's latest statement. With the issue left as it is between the two divisions of! Ireland for settlement between themselves, it is obviously the better course for the Irish, Free State to persuade Northern Ireland the benefits of absorption than to seek for a forced union in which Whitehall as definitely' committed itself not to assist.
With the development of the Japanese manceuvres the magnitude of the grandiose scheme behind them becomes apparent. For some time there has been talk of the Japanese domination of China's coastal provinces, but as time passes it is being demonstrated that the Japanese contemplate the occupation of the territory between the railways stretching from Canton to Peiping and the coast. Just where their western frontier would be is not at the moment clear, but it is manifest that Japanese control of Canton, and the railway would permit of the easy maintenance of their troops along a line of communications somewhere behind their front. Successful development of such a plan would produce a similar situation north of the Yangtze, with the result that such a line with ports available in the south, on the Yangtze and the north connected with railways would permit of the main-{tenance of a well-organized and supplied front. against Generalissimo Chiang Kal-shek in the southwest and west of China. It is indeed a grandiose scheme which will undoubtedly involve Japan more deeply in China than she originally contemplated, The task _of establishing control over the area so bounded must prove a difficult one, probably requiring more men than have at present been brought to China, Even in the north where some provinces have been overrun for nearly a year it cannot be said that the Japanese have established full control. They have it is true command of the outlets and lines of communication but the activities of the guerillas clearly prove that the task of subjugation is still a long way from completion, which stage indeed it may never reach. So long as Chiang Kal-shek can keep his armies intact it can never be said that he is beaten, and the opportunities of harassing the Japanese will always remain. If the Chinese are willing even now to accept the prospect of many years of hostilities which may be still ahead of them. they may yet present Japan with a victory, pyrrhic in its expensiveness. That will entail the maintenance of good morale amongst the Chinese. Their officials may be right in believing that revelation of unpalatable fact may weaken that morale, though from the evidence provided by the past behaviour of the Chinese in this struggle indicates that the publication of the truth would probably do no very great harm,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.