Stability in the Far East is described as the goal of Japanese policy. This has recently been reaffirmed by Dr. Yotaro Sugimuri in conversation with this journal. It_ is also the burden of semi-official Japanese tatements. It finds expression in the arguments of most chronic ders of current events in this part of the world Stability nowadays is difficult to define. Quest of it may be claimed b; Herr Hitler's henchmen as the; strive to eliminate formal opposition. Mr. Franklin Roosevelt is, Just' now, leaving bankers. guessing inthe name of stability. So the fact that Dr. Sugimuri whose diplomatic position is marked by more freedom than responsibility—has learnt from his Geneva experiences the value of a topical catchword is not surprising. Justice to Japan demands the comment that the preoccupations of the rest of the world in fianeial turmoil centring in Europe could not fairly be regarded as imposing on the Far East a placid acquiescence in temporary neglect. Geographically, politically and nationally, Japan has more concern with the state of Far Eastern affairs than any other nation. Consequently her insistence on stability here Togical and natural. No useful purpose is presently. served by retracing the ground of recent controversy. Tt is sufficient to observe that the Instability over which Japan is fo anxious to-day seems to derive no little of its persistence from the train of events since September, 1981, In that fateful month Japan abandoned her policy of ce-operation with the others powers in the Far Fast. She may have had, in her own eyes, admirable reasons for that step'and the other breaks which it entailed. The fact remains that even if Japan herself has gained in solidarity and stability points which no doubt the observer will be ready to concede—the same qualities have not remarkably shown themselves. even in those places on account of which Japan's solicitude for stability was expressly stirred. When therefore observation of the problems of the Far East tends to invite ce-operation with Japan as the apostle of stability it is important to consider the nature of the stability contemplated. Tt is also important to note that Japan herself is not too clear on the point.
Without attaching undue significance to the remarix of a diplomatist in Dr. Sugimari's enviable position, it will be re~ called that he claimed for his country a desire to avoid con-with the' interests and Policies of other powers. He discounted suggestions that the im of Tokyo's dispositions was a divided China—a triumph of the Nanking Government over its present political difficulties would be welcomed. If this is developed in Japanese relations with China there seems to be no reason why satisfactory solutions of outstanding—issues should not be achieved. Perhaps the keynote of Dr. Sugi-mun's version of Tokyo's creed was the denial of any Machiavellian intent. In the world today, as in the world of yesterday, there must be a tendency to take a map, study its topographical and political features and work out, as on a chess board, the possible moves of nations which seem for some reason or other to be taking the initiative at the moment. This vecupation may be suitable for the recreation of atvategists and other preventive experts. In some respects it is misleading and, even, dangerous for the ordinary student of affairs. This explains in some measure the conflicting opinions passe¢ on the underlying causes of Japanese actions in the last two years, There is the economic argument which talks of pepulation pressure, the need pansion, the preservation ¢' life blood and the like. Therei the Political appreciation of he situation; it discerns the wisdom of emphasising the precedence entailed by Japan's geographical position. There is the purely military search for a secure frontier by creating—buff states and advance lines of a fence. There is the sentimental view which seeks to apostrophise Japanese achievement in terms of dominance of the Pacific. Finally there is the purely domestic outlook which reduces Japan's recent and present actions to the denominator of a struggle between rival factions within Japan itself.
Clearly a problem regarding: in this light requires sympathy tic handling, Recrimination ix irrelevant, even dangerous. More-exer the relations established be: (ween Japan and other powers reason of Japan's own excellences deserve a consideration which possible errors and, even, acknowledged asperities should not be allowed to obscure. If sentiment too greatly governs that contention, then practical convenience may be called upon to support a sage development of ce-operation in such 4 form as Japan's self Imposed departure from her former international associations may' be found to render possible. Yet it is necessary to inqu whether, even now, Japan full realises the implications of the burdens taken on her shoulders. The situation in the Far East is riot static, despite the search for stability, The stabilisation of one point of Japanese concern has ed logically and actually to the immediate discovery of a further object of the same attentions. The splash created by that stone thrown into the pool of Mai churian discontent in Septembe 1931, has widened with ever larger citoles of influence. The Khingan Range, the Amur, Outer Mongolia, the Yellow River and, now, even the Yangtze Valley, come into the picture. A still disordered body politic in China ix bemused and, in some degree, Perturbed by the difficulty of ettingy bounds to. the process of Japanisation. The latest suyegestion that Manchoukuo will shortly assume the dignity of a Hkingdom may for example have profound effect on Peking and make the present efforts for effective understanding between the Northern Military Council jand the Japanese the merest makeshift devices pending the revival of Manchu vision in the Porbidden City. It is true that the disunity of the rest of China prevents appropriate measures in remedy of this erosion. It is also true that on Japan's side there seems to be no guarantee that the responsibilities hitherto ncented can be kept entirely within the bounds of Tokyo's own sense of proportion. These deductions imply no reproach of Japan for reproach is impossible without re-entering the arid arena of controversy over past actions, They show merely that the well conceived programme of developing friendly relations with Japan must for Chinese statesmen carry a delicate and embarrassing perplexity. "It also [charges other nations with' interests and duties in the Far East with the obligation to restate their friendship with Japan in terms of an elastic forbear vance which, while rejecting the blind endorsement of all. the claims made by exuberant Japanese apologists, takes sympathetically and impartially into account the validity of the claims now staked out by Japan in the name of stability.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.