May. 6.
Japanese anxiety to invoke the old spirit of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in support of the theory that Great Britain has faltered in her friendship can be interpreted as a sign of grace. It at least means. that there is a desire. to remove salitees of misunderstanding, even if the logic of the resultant arguments cannot be entirely acopted. Yesterday, in these columns, undesigned coincidence set -off a Soviet writer's fierce attack on Japan's imperialism" against an exposition of Anglo-'Japanese relationships by a Brit-igh journalist well-known for his Tong acquaintance with Japan and for his close association with official Japanese opinion. Tat it at once be pointed out that the circulation of his article dri advance of its publication in "Contemporary Japan," which is 'a reputable review of recent origin but clearly propagand direction, indicates a feeling of the need to explain certain expressions of Japanese sentiment in criticism of Great Brita during the last two years. On that account it would be ungracious to analyze Mr. Kennedy's historical disquisition too closely. His reading of the causes of the non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance follows the popular line "of argument vocally taken by those who are: merely concerned to prove that that alliance should still be in existence,, regardless, it is to be feared, of the actual facts of the situation which rendered it not only dangerous but actually the certain source of international misunderstanding. Examination of that point and Mr. Kennedy's ingenious but misleading endorsement of Japanese suspicions regarding the Singapore base would not be helpful in developing the theme of recent Anglo-Japanese relation: shi Tt would assuredly impel 8 references to certain events which were best ignored.
Simpler is it to go straight to the point at which Anglo-Japanese policy: in' China ha: lately seemed to strike a diver-[gence of view. Mr. Kennedy and those who think with him forget that, until September, 1931, there existed an understanding which was developing satisfactorily and with every prospect of "benefit to the general situation here. Tt is a natter of record and not of opinion that, September 15, 1931, a leading article in this journal set forth in some detail Japan's grievances against the Chinese Government. This"statement—the comment is made in no spirit of boasting—Put Japan's case as forcibly a Tokyo at that time would have desired. Moreover it put the case ina form which, consistently with Japan's then accepted obligations under the Covenant and the Washington Treaty, could have been brought before an international tribunal with far more confidence than the subsequent representations, made when Japanese policy was daily struggling with the implications of Japanese action. Mr, Kennedy plainly suggests that, alarmed by the "Chinese Government's declared intention to abolish extraterritoriality, the Japanese {were compelled to force the [issue in "disregard of thei obligations under the treaties. 'This is an attempt to supply ex post facto" justification for actions which' otherwise could not be defended and to commend the justification by playing on well-recognized apprehensions. It ignores the repeated suggestions that the Japanese are prepared to agree to the abolition of extraterritoriality, in Man-' choukuo and, possibly, else-'0 ignores the officially admitted in ment to the British Parl—that Great Britain and Japan, before the incident of September 18, 1931, were in close and amicable' consultation over the negotiations regarding—extraterritoriality. The same condition governed British and American relationships.
'The real explanation of the course of Japanese actions from September, 1931, onwards, as can be gathered by any one who has studied these columns, is to be found in the trend of' Japanese Internal politics. 'The putsch at Mukden was primarily designed by the opponents of the Shidehara policy to commit their: Government to a "forward" ste} in Manchuria, Its successful commendation' to a carefully' manipulated public opinion in Japan encouraged its promoters land their friends to persevere, While "Japan's spokesmen at Geneva "in November, 1981, were sincerely" arguing on the lines of the Shidehara policy—hence the suggestion for the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the Manchurian affair came from them—they were being regularly confounded by the succession of events in the area under discussion. By the turn of the New Year, the Shidehara policy was completely out of the picture. Japan received the Lytton Commission with contumely and Japan's representatives in Geneva came into line with the new outlook. To argue, as Mr, Kennedy attempts to do, that Great Britain kas been out ayaraciy, wie saan difficulties in Manchuria patently to' ignore the facts. Japan's special interests were all along recognized" and Great Britain was constantly pressing that point on. public attention.—British obligations to the League could not be' neglected and it was the common remark by British
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.